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Addressing compromised device is a problem for virtually all large organizations. Com-
promised devices can propagate malware resulting in theft of computing resources, loss of
sensitive data, and extortion of money. Unfortunately, large organizations do not have an oracle
into device compromise. Instead, organizations must address compromise without straight-
forward answers to critical questions such as: “Is this device compromised?”, “Why/How is
this device compromised?”, “What’s the best intervention?”. This problem, in part, results
from limited observational vantage points, differences in intervention capabilities, and evolving
adversaries with differing incentives. In this dissertation, I develop systems that empirically
xv
address multiple types of device compromise using large-scale observations within different
organizations, thus placing us on a stronger footing to devise better interventions.
I first describe an approach used at Facebook for detecting malicious browsers extensions.
I present a methodology whereby users exhibiting suspicious online behaviors are scanned (with
permission) to identify extensions in their browsers, and those extensions are in turn labeled
based on the threat indicators they contain. Employing this methodology at Facebook I identify
more than 1,700 lexically distinct malicious extensions, and use this labeling to drive user device
clean-up efforts as well notify browser vendors.
Next, I examine for-profit services offering to artificially manipulate a user’s social
standing on Instagram. I identify the techniques used by these services to drive social actions,
detail how they are structured to evade straightforward detection, and characterize the dynamics
of their customer base. Finally, I construct controlled experiments to disrupt these services and
analyze how different approaches to intervention can drive different reactions, thus providing
distinct trade-offs for defenders.
Lastly, I describe a large-scale measurement of 15,000 laptop and desktop devices on
a university’s network to characterize the prevalence of security “best practices” and security-
relevant behaviors, and quantify how they relate to device compromise. I use passive network
traffic analysis techniques to infer a broad range of device features and per-machine compromise
state. I find a number of behaviors positively correlate with host compromise, and few “best
practices” exhibit negative correlations that would support their value in improving end user
security.
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Introduction
Large organizations connect a multitude of devices, and house sensitive information.
Unsurprisingly, they also attract unwanted malicious and abusive actions originating from
compromised devices using their platforms. Some of these actions result in the propagation
of malware [10, 9, 18, 55], theft of computing resources [59, 73], and extortion of money [15].
Indeed, large organizations dedicate significant effort to preventing many types of compromise
from impacting their platforms.
Unfortunately, large organizations do not have an oracle into device compromise. Instead,
in many cases organizations must address compromise without straightforward answers to vitally
important questions: Is a device compromised? Why/How is device a compromised? What’s the
best intervention?, etc. This problem, in part, results from limited observations available at each
organization’s vantage point (e.g., actions within a social network, encrypted network traffic
connections, etc.), the types of interventions at an organization’s disposal, and continuously
evolving adversaries with differing incentives. In some cases, traditional countermeasures such
as blacklisting or rate limiting are sufficient to address compromise. However, a motivated
adversary may be able to subvert these interventions. Deriving an empirical understanding
around device compromise is critical for developing long-lasting and effective interventions.
Specifically, the prevalence of differing types of compromise coupled with the constrained
vantage points and intervention capabilities of large organizations creates a need to develop
empirically-grounded systems, that in-turn, can help drive intervention efforts.
In this thesis, I address the challenges inherent in developing systems aiming to remediate
compromised devices engaging with large organizations. In particular, I demonstrate multiple
1
approaches for developing systems to address different types of device compromise using large-
scale observations within organizations, thereby placing us on a stronger footing to devise better
interventions. I describe multiple real-world and large-scale studies where I develop empirically-
driven systems at three large organizations. In each system, the organization’s vantage point,
intervention techniques, and types of compromise differ. Specifically, I develop systems to:
detect and cleanup browser malware, understand and disrupt abusive underground services
selling inauthentic actions on online social networks, and explore how a range of recommended
security practices (e.g., using antivirus, etc.) and behaviors correlate with ground truth security
outcomes.
In the first study, I develop a system to detect and mitigate malicious browser extensions
(MBE) impacting the online social network Facebook (Chapter 1). This work is motivated by
previous studies that develop techniques to detect MBEs, and find that online social networks
are a commonly targeted by MBEs. In 2014, Kapravelos et al. [50] develop a system that detects
MBEs using dynamic analysis to study an extension’s behavior when accessing honey Web
pages that try and trick browser extensions into exhibiting malicious behavior. Similarly, in
2015, Jagpal et al. [47] describe a system used at Google to quickly detect MBE uploaded to the
Chrome Web Store (an extension marketplace) by periodically monitoring the static and dynamic
behaviors of each extension. In both related studies, the systems process browser extensions
directly and evaluate each extension on a periodic basis.
From the perspective of an online social network the extensions themselves are not
directly accessible. Additionally, how or why the extension is installed is unknown. Instead,
malicious behaviors from browser extensions targeting online social network are observable.
By leveraging these malicious behaviors first-hand, I drive detection and cleanup efforts of
MBEs. I first discuss some examples of how Facebook can identify user accounts that are
likely compromised. Next, I describe the workings of a custom malware scanner that uses static
analysis to process browser extensions. From the processed extensions, I develop an automated
MBE labeling system that uses malicious indicators (e.g., URLs, IP addresses, etc.) identified
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by Facebook to classify MBEs. Deploying this system at Facebook over six weeks, I identify
more than 1,700 new lexically distinct MBEs, show that existing anti-malware and anti-abuse
mechanisms offer limited effectiveness against the MBEs, and notify anti-malware and browser
vendors.
In the second study, I develop a system for the online social network Instagram to detect
and disrupt underground markets offering to artificially inflate an Instagram account’s social
status (Chapter 2). Users with more followers are able to reach larger audiences with their
posts and thus can be seen as carrying more “weight” in some abstract social hierarchy. Since
this standing is directly monetizable via advertising, it is unsurprising that this aspect of social
media has attracted organized abuse. These underground services have evolved adversarially as
a result of prior interventions and the demand for more “real looking” actions: from producing
inauthentic actions by way of fake or bot accounts, to utilizing more sophisticated techniques
involving real Instagram accounts. Similar to my work on MBEs, the actions from abusive
services can be observed directly by an online social network’s vantage point. However, unlike
browser extensions the malicious software is not required to run directly on each device making
the use of a malware scanner-like approach impractical.
I describe two techniques used by popular underground services to artificially inflate the
social status of an Instagram user’s account: collusion networks and reciprocity abuse. I then
develop a honeypot account framework for Instagram that allows me to engage with abusive
services as a customer. I design the honeypot account framework in a way that enables the
systematic creation of both fake and real looking honeypot accounts. I use the honeypot account
framework to attribute abusive actions to each underground service, to evaluate how services
use their customer’s Instagram accounts, and to quantify the natural effects of reciprocation
that are exploited by reciprocity abuse services. Next, by using a set of signals produced by
Instagram I am able to identify the broader set of actions produced by each service. This rich data
set allows me to estimate each service’s customer population size, customer stability, monthly
gross revenue, the types of service that are most popular among customers, and biases in how
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reciprocity abuse services operate. Finally, using my understanding of how these service operate
I develop two controlled interventions to compare the effectiveness of different countermeasures
(e.g., blocking actions, etc.). The first explores how a small fraction of service customers react
to different countermeasure techniques, and the second measures the service-wide reaction to
different countermeasure techniques when applied to a large fraction of abusive actions. I find
that underground services are able to attract a large clientele, and generate over $1M in monthly
revenue. Additionally, different approaches to intervention (i.e., transparent interventions such
as blocking abusive services vs. more opaque approaches such as deferred removal of artificial
actions) can drive different reactions and thus provide distinct trade-offs for defenders.
In the third and final study, I develop a system that passively monitors a university’s
residential network to explore how a range of security “best practices” (e.g., using antivirus,
updating software quickly, etc.) and behaviors (e.g., the types of Websites visited, etc.) correlate
to ground truth security outcomes (Chapter 3). Security is a discipline that places significant
expectations on lay users. In fact, there are a wide array of technologies and behaviors that end
users are expected to adopt and thereby reduce their security risk. However, the adoption of
these “best practices” — ranging from the use of antivirus products to actively keeping software
updated — is not well understood, nor is their practical impact on security risk well-established.
I describe the architecture and implementation of a large-scale passive network monitor-
ing system that produces per-device models measuring a range of security practice and behavioral
features. Unlike the vantage point of online social networks which is constrained to social net-
work actions, passive network traffic contains a broader set of device actions (e.g., software
updates, social network activity, etc.). However, this activity is encoded within network traffic,
and fine-grained detail into the context of each action is commonly obscured by encryption.
Consequently, network traffic requires considerable processing to identify device features. To
address these challenges, I develop network traffic signatures that enable the detection of a range
of security practices and behaviors. I then use operational security logs and network intrusion
detection system (IDS) alerts to identify compromised machines on the network. Combining this
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information, I investigate how recommended security practices and behaviors correlate to device
compromise. Lastly, I describe a logistic model that compares device features in terms of their
ability to predict security outcomes relative to one another. Analyzing months of longitudinal
data I find that a number of recommended security “best practices” are followed, however, they
do not negatively correlate with device compromise. Most positively correlated is the type of
web sites a device visits (e.g., adult content, video games, etc.), and the volume of traffic devices
produce. Subsequently, using a logistic model I find that behavioral features such as visiting
web sites related to gaming and illegal content are relatively more useful for distinguishing
compromised devices.
In this dissertation, I demonstrate multiple approaches to develop empirically-grounded
systems that address device compromise within different organizations. I present solutions that
take advantage of analytic data to determine: what is measurable under the limitations in each
organization’s vantage point, as well as the trade-offs across different types of intervention. This
dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, I develop a system for an online social network
to detect and cleanup MBE. In Chapter 2, I develop a system for an online social network to
understand and disrupt underground markets selling inauthentic actions. In Chapter 3, I develop
a system for an enterprise network to explore how recommended security practices and behaviors
correlate to ground truth security outcomes. Finally, I conclude in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 1
Malicious Browser Extensions at Scale
In this chapter, we develop an automated framework for Facebook that identifies and
mitigates malicious browser extensions (MBE) targeting the online social network. Online
social networks are not in a position to easily detect and remove known MBEs from infected
devices. From the vantage point of an online social network, malicious activity can be directly
experienced. However, the extensions themselves are not readily available. We overcome
these obstacles by developing a custom malware scanner that labels extensions using threat
indicators previously associated with abusive behavior. We describe the scanner’s methodology
for propagating malicious indicators across browser extensions, and present an evaluation of the
system when deployed at Facebook over a few weeks. Our system quickly detects and mitigates
new MBEs. We also find that existing anti-abuse and anti-malware offer limited effectiveness
against MBEs.
1.1 Introduction
Today, Web browsers encapsulate dynamic code, interact with users and are implicated
in virtually every activity performed on computers from e-mail to game playing. While some
of these activities have been made possible by enhancements to the standard languages and
capabilities supported by the browsers themselves, many others are made possible via browser
extensions designed to augment this baseline functionality.
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Notably, browser extensions enable customization not only with respect to visual appear-
ance (e.g., by changing the look and feel of the browser), but also on a deep behavioral level
(i.e., in the way the browser interacts with Web sites). Browsers enable the latter functionality
by allowing extensions to use a set of permissions that Web sites do not normally have. For
example, extensions are capable of modifying HTTP headers, bypassing the Content Security
Policy (CSP) [96] set by Web site owners and hiding the results of any actions by rewriting Web
site content before it is displayed. These capabilities allow extensions to offer complex and
rich modifications to the user experience and support the implementation of services that would
otherwise be impossible to implement. However, these same capabilities can provide a powerful
vehicle for performing malicious attacks [20]. Unsurprisingly, this problem has evolved from one
of abstract potential into a concrete threat, and today the problem of MBEs is widely understood
to be real and growing [81, 20, 58, 50, 47]. We consider MBEs to be extensions that take actions
on behalf of a user without their consent, or replace Facebook’s key functionality or content.
Unfortunately, detecting MBEs is challenging because the malicious nature of a given
extension can manifest dynamically and the online targets of its abuse have no natural way
to attribute those behaviors back to particular extensions. More concretely, while a browser
vendor or extension marketplace is in a position to inspect extension code, inferring malicious
intent may not be possible from that vantage point. In addition to the traditional challenges
with such code analysis approaches (e.g., polymorphic encoding), extensions routinely fetch
resources from third-party sites and, as a result, an extension may only exhibit malicious actions
at certain times or when certain Web services are visited. Conversely, from the vantage point
of a targeted Web service, abusive actions may be clear, but the source of those actions can be
murky. Extensions frequently hide by emulating a normal user’s interactions and there are no
standard mechanisms to link browser actions back to a particular extension (or even to enumerate
the extensions present on a user’s browser). Indeed, because the viewpoint of the Web service
provider is limited to the Document Object Model (DOM) there is no shared language by which
they can crisply share threat intelligence with browser vendors or extension marketplaces.
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In this paper, we have started to bridge this gap between the Web site and browser
vantage points, which we believe will enable more effective interventions against the threat of
MBEs. In particular, we examine MBEs from the perspective of Facebook — which, among
others, is extensively targeted by such extensions (e.g. [47]). We describe our approach for
automatically collecting browser extensions of interest, detecting the malicious ones (within
seconds of reaching Facebook’s infrastructure) and then working to remove such extensions
from our customer ecosystem. In particular, this paper describes the following contributions:
• A methodology for collecting browser extensions from devices suspected of malware
compromise.
• A methodology for automated labeling of malicious extensions using indicators we ex-
tract from the collected samples and threat indicators previously associated with abusive
behavior.
• Deploying this methodology at Facebook, we identify more than 1700 malicious Chrome
and Firefox extensions1 out of a total of more than 34000 scanned extensions during a
6-week period spanning late 2016 into 2017.
• We show that existing anti-malware and anti-abuse mechanisms only offer limited effec-
tiveness against MBEs, addressing a small fraction of the samples we detect (and with far
greater delay when they do).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides an overview of
browser extensions and related work; Section 1.3 outlines Facebook’s approach for detecting
compromised user accounts, and collecting and analyzing browser extensions; Section 1.4
describes the automated extension labeling system, and Section 1.5 evaluates it, characterizing
the volume of extensions Facebook deals with and system behavior over time; Section 1.6
motivates the need for the new labeling system; and Section 1.7 concludes.
1While most recent browsers support extensions (e.g. Safari, Opera, Internet Explorer, etc.), we focus on Chrome
and Firefox since visitors using these two browsers constitute 54% and 13% of browser traffic respectively seen per
day at Facebook.
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1.2 Background
Browser authors have tried to provide as dynamic and programmable experience as
possible, but inevitably some applications have required capabilities beyond those provided via
standard Web programming interfaces. To address this need, virtually all major browsers support
extension interfaces. Extensions written to these interfaces are allowed to execute code, interact
with the browser core and initiate network calls — all independent of particular Web pages being
viewed. While extensions can use a variety of technologies and languages, for this paper we will
be focusing on HTML and JavaScript (JS) which are used predominantly in the development of
Chrome and Firefox extensions.
Because browser extensions are given permission to interact with the browser in manners
that would otherwise be classified as “high-risk” [56], there is a range of opportunities to enable
malicious behavior. For example, extensions can violate typical cross-site request forgery
(CSRF) or cross-site scripting (XSS) protections, inject arbitrary code in a page’s DOM, rewrite
its content, and access Web traffic as a page is being loaded (including all cookies and POST
parameters). Indeed, the permissions available are sufficiently powerful that they can even
prevent the user from removing an extension once loaded.
Users frequently load browser extensions via online marketplaces (e.g., the Chrome Web
store), which try to vet both code and authors, and remove extensions that are clearly abusive.
However, browsers also allow a range of alternate “sideloading” options including manual
installation, operating system administrative policies, and native binaries. While browser vendors
are actively reducing such sideloading opportunities, attackers have shown great creativity in
bypassing ad hoc limits. Moreover, even when the browser is configured to prevent sideloading,
we have observed one class of malware (BePush) enabling sideloading by simply installing an
older version of the browser that lacks such protections.
These issues have been understood for some time, with Dhawan and Ganapathy identify-
ing early malicious extensions in 2009 and proposing techniques to protect against them [20].
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Researchers have shown similar problems exist in modern browsers [56, 27, 90, 13] and large-
scale empirical measurements [50] and operational experience [47] show that malicious browser
extensions are a widespread problem. Much of the existing research in this space has focused
on how to either better harden the browser [58, 21, 56, 34] or to provide a better mechanism for
vetting code in extension marketplaces [4].
Our work builds on ideas from these prior efforts. Our approach is data driven, like
the work of Jagpal et al. [47] and Kapravelos et al. [50], but is based on static analysis using
Facebook’s own contemporaneous threat indicator data (e.g., abusive domains / URLs) to label
extensions. This allows our approach to be browser-agnostic and adapt quickly to changes in the
kinds of abuse being perpetrated on Facebook. Of course, Rice’s theorem says there is no way to
figure out whether a piece of code will be malicious, so there is no way to make a promise to
catch every MBE. We further describe a soup-to-nuts operational workflow — including how
we obtain samples, process and label them, and remediate affected users.
1.3 Collecting Browser Malware
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Figure 1.1. An overview of our system highlighting the detection, malware scanner, and
static analysis steps. The dashed arrows describe normal user interaction, and solid arrows are
transitions within the described system.
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Facebook has collected more than 1 700 unique malicious samples over the 6-week
analysis period.2 Naturally, manual analysis of extensions at this scale is infeasible, so Facebook
has developed new techniques to automate the collection and analysis of samples.
In this section we describe some of the ways Facebook detects malware-compromised
user accounts. We further outline what happens after detecting such accounts and, specifically,
how we collect and analyze the responsible malware samples from malware victims’ computers
via a custom malware scanner. Finally, we report on the initial analysis we perform on the
collected extensions.
1.3.1 Detecting Compromised User Accounts
The process of acquiring new malware samples starts by detecting user accounts suspected
of being compromised with malware. At a high level, this process is guided by the clustering
and classification systems (shown in Figure 1.1) using as input (i) signals of abnormal activity,
(ii) client-side third-party injected code in Facebook’s DOM, (iii) and user-reported objectionable
content. While the detailed process of detecting malware-compromised accounts is mainly
beyond the scope of this work, in the following paragraphs we present some examples of related
signals.
Negative Feedback. In the event a user account is compromised with malware, the
malware may attempt to either use the compromised account for monetization — e.g. by posting
links that redirect to ad-filled pages — or to spread the infection by posting links to malware. The
latter usually happens via clickbait. In either case, Facebook users have the ability to report the
content as objectionable (e.g. abusive, malicious, etc.), and links to such content may eventually
get blacklisted.
Spiking Content. Facebook’s real-time abuse detection systems monitor the time series
of user activity to detect anomalies based on diurnal patterns of normal activity. Such anomalies
fall into two high-level categories: anomalies that can be remediated automatically, and ones that
2Uniqueness is based on MD5 hashes of extension contents.
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need an analyst to examine and take action.
An example of the latter case would be auto-generated objectionable content being
shared on Facebook (e.g. adult content) with similar characteristics, e.g. directing viewers to the
same external domain that results in a drive-by malware infection. In such a case, the analyst
would typically add the related domains to a blacklist and enqueue the users participating in
such activity into a malware cleanup flow. Anomalies that can be auto-remediated are either
simple anomalies that make use of other high quality signals (e.g. spiking negative feedback) or
anomalies that have been previously seen and the responses are already codified.
DOM-based indicators. Facebook uses client-side code to self-inspect its own rendered
DOM for injected third-party code. One challenge with client-side code is that a MBE may
attempt to prevent such code from running. In the event third-party code is discovered, code-
specific features are analyzed by Facebook’s clustering and classification systems. When features
related to malware are identified, users’ devices containing such features may get enrolled into a
malware cleanup flow.
1.3.2 Malware Scanner and Cleanup
Once Facebook identifies an account suspected of having been compromised by malware,
the account may be enrolled in a process that is capable of detecting and remediating malware
via an online scan session.3 This process is shown in Figure 1.1 under “Malware Cleanup”.
Following user consent (see Figure 1.2), the user downloads a one-time malware scanner that runs
on the potentially compromised system. If user consent is not provided, the user can continue
to access their account using other devices. After a cool-down period the potentially-infected
device is allowed to access Facebook again.
Once the scanner process starts, it inspects locations on the file system known to hold
Firefox and Chrome extensions. For each observed sample, the scanner communicates the file
hash with Facebook’s infrastructure, which in turn provides a verdict on whether Facebook
3If the account was recently enrolled, it may not be re-enrolled.
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Figure 1.2. The user consent prompt explaining actions the Facebook scanner will take if the
user agrees. In this instance the scanner is paired with a third party scanner responsible for
removing other types of infections.
believes the sample is malicious. Suspicious extensions or files that have not been seen before
(e.g. based on their extension ID) are uploaded to Facebook’s infrastructure for real-time analysis.
When Facebook’s server-side infrastructure indicates to the scanner that a sample is malicious,
the scanner attempts to start a cleanup routine that removes the offending sample.
1.3.3 Static Analysis
After the we collect and store samples on ThreatExchange4 – Facebook’s threat intelli-
gence infrastructure – and while the malware scanner is still running on the user’s device, we
initiate a static analysis pipeline that extracts threat intelligence from the samples.
Our decision for using a static versus a dynamic analysis is based on the understanding
that the specific malicious extensions being analyzed are already exhibiting their malicious
behavior at collection time. Consequently, we do not have to overcome issues of, e.g., time-
gating that a dynamic analysis would be helpful for [47]. Although we execute several distinct
analysis functions, the following three are relevant to this paper.
Unpacking. We start by unpacking the sample. Then, we recursively schedule analysis
4https://developers.facebook.com/products/threat-exchange
13
for any files contained within the extracted object. This function can be unsafe in the case where
the archive is compressed and has malicious intent, which we handle via sanity checks, such as a
limited recursion depth.
Indicator extraction. We attempt to extract threat indicators from each potential mal-
ware sample without parsing binaries or code. Instead, we treat each file as a plain text document.
This approach, although naive, still generates actionable intelligence from each sample.
We use a series of regular expressions to extract Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), IP
addresses, domain names, cryptographic hashes, browser extension IDs, and email addresses.
In addition, we attempt to deobfuscate, decompress, decode, and otherwise clean up the code
contained in the extensions we analyze. We also make reasonable effort to repair broken URLs
and other malformed data.
Once we have the set of initially extracted indicators, we make a second pass, but this
time on the extracted data. During this pass we attempt to find more indicators using the type of
the original indicator as a clue. For example, for URL indicators that contain API keys, the first
pass extracts the URL and the second pass extracts the API key from the URL.
External sharing. We share the full collected samples with ThreatExchange and Virus-
Total only if either of the following two conditions are met: (i) the number of users having
the specific sample are beyond a specific threshold, or (ii) in the case of Chrome extensions, if
the extension is live on the Chrome store. We are able to detect the latter by constructing and
accessing a URL that points to the extension on the Chrome Web store.
1.4 Browser Extension Labeling
In this section we describe our methodology for labeling browser extensions. Labels
represent a status of maliciousness, and we assign extensions one of two values in decreasing
order of severity:
• MALICIOUS samples are those deemed with high confidence to be malicious. The malware
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scanner described in Section 1.3.2 will subsequently remove them when users agree to an
anti-virus scan.
• UNKNOWN is the default status for all samples for which we do not have a definitive opinion.
We describe the rules our system uses to propagate labels from individual indicators all
the way to entire extensions, and also how changing labels propagate through the system. While
the system automatically extracts indicators and propagates labels, there are some situations
where traditional manual analysis still plays a role and we end by discussing how the system
incorporates input from analysts.
1.4.1 Automated Extension Labeling
We start by assigning high-quality labels to individual threat indicators (e.g. URLs).
These indicators come primarily from the system responsible for identifying spam activity, as
described in Section 1.3.1, which the labeling system assumes to be ground truth. In essence,
the malware labeling process is designed to apply these vetted threat labels onto the indicators
extracted from samples via the static analysis pipeline (Section 1.3.3).
All indicators receive an initial label, but Facebook also maintains a feedback process to
flag and re-evaluate them over time if it learns new information. As a result, a URL erroneously
marked as MALICIOUS, for example, will be appropriately re-labeled. This update will then
automatically propagate to the relevant samples, which will subsequently be queued for re-
labeling.
Propagating Maliciousness Labels
At a high level, our automated browser extension labeling system operates under the
basic assumption that if a text file (e.g. a JS file) contains indicators marked as MALICIOUS in
the ground truth data, then we can deterministically propagate this label to the containing file.
Furthermore, if a file labeled as MALICIOUS is a part of container (e.g. a browser extension),
then we can deterministically propagate that label to the container. For example, if the URL
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http://www.example.com/evil.php is considered MALICIOUS, and a file background.js contains
this URL, then the file will be labeled as MALICIOUS. And if a Chrome extension goats.crx
contains background.js, then the extension will also be labeled as malicious.
In practice, there are also cases that require an explicit policy decision on how to
propagate labels. Although the policies we have chosen may introduce noise into the analysis,
our experience has been that overall the system has a sufficient number of strong indicators that
it overcomes that noise when it ultimately labels extensions.
Shared resources. If an indicator represents a shared resource — e.g. an IP address
used as a Network Address Translation protocol (NAT) gateway — it can be used by both benign
and bad actors concurrently. In this case, labeling a file that contains the named IP address as
MALICIOUS would be equivalent to erroneously marking all traffic originating from that IP as
MALICIOUS. For simplicity of implementation, our policy is to still propagate labels even on
indicators for shared resources, rather than to try to identify and differentiate between shared and
non-shared situations.
Inactive code. Another example are inactive blocks of code referencing MALICIOUS in-
dicators. Indeed, the malicious block of code is not executable, why label the file as MALICIOUS?
Our policy is to still propagate the label from indicators on inactive code to the containing object.
We argue that, if an actor has the capability to add any type of code into a file, then they may
also have the ability to activate previously inactive malicious code.
Gating. Finally, indicators with geographically or temporally gated malice have the
potential of erroneously labeling samples when the labeling action occurs outside such boundaries.
For geographic gating, our policy is to disregard the boundary and apply globally the label of the
indicators with the highest severity. If any users experience malicious behavior, our goal is to
protect all users. However, temporal gating requires more attention, specifically for indicators
that have been malicious in the past, but, after re-evaluation, we can positively characterize them
as not malicious.
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Cleaning Up False Positives
The system needs to react quickly and automatically to the discovery of false positives.
If the system incorrectly labels an extension as MALICIOUS, then the extension will be removed
by the malware scanner the next time devices with the extension are scanned.
Using the same rule engine used for propagating labels from indicators to files and
extensions, we also create a set of rules to automate correcting false positives. Specifically, if an
indicator changes status from MALICIOUS to a lesser severity (e.g., UNKNOWN), (i) we identify all
malware samples containing the indicator, (ii) we filter out all samples that have any status other
than MALICIOUS, and (iii) for the remaining samples we set their status to UNKNOWN if they do not
have any remaining MALICIOUS indicators. Similarly, when the a MALICIOUS sample receives a
new, less severe status, we re-compute the status of its containers by applying the same set of
rules used for updating indicators.
Known False Positives
Throughout the 6-week measurement period our system collected over 34k unique
extensions of which 124 are known to have been incorrectly labeled as MALICIOUS. Additionally,
the median time to identify a false positive is 18 days. As a result, in 0.8% of total scan sessions,
our system removed one or more of these 124 extensions erroneously. After the extension is
removed, the user can re-install the extension and likely will not be re-enrolled in the malware
cleanup process described in Section 1.3.2. We consider this number of false positives as small
in number and of an acceptable magnitude.
1.4.2 Manual Labeling
While we consider our automated MBE labeling system highly effective, there are also
cases where a threat analyst may need to manually examine a sample to decide its status. Such
cases include: (i) Suspicious extensions with highly obfuscated code that circumvents the
static analysis pipeline’s ability to extract threat indicators. (ii) Suspicious samples that may
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contain evolved adversarial capacity to bypass our detection capabilities. Even if the sample
was correctly labeled as MALICIOUS, in such cases analysts are responsible for examining the
samples and communicating their findings within Facebook. (iii) Malicious indicators or samples
that are responsible for labeling multiple samples within a short period of time and beyond a
certain alerting threshold. Such cases are indicative of a commonly reused, erroneously labeled
MALICIOUS sample, and the manual analysis step will prevent many false positives.
Any threat status manually applied by an analyst always dominates labels originating
from the automated systems. Therefore, such systems are configured to never overwrite an
analyst-originating threat label.
1.4.3 A Real World Example
To make this process more concrete, we conclude with an end-to-end example of a botnet
that targets Facebook users to disseminate malicious content. A user’s browser becomes infected
when the MBE5 is installed via the Chrome Web Store (it is unknown if installation is a result of
user choice, or through another attack vector). Once installed, the extension monitors all Web
content that the user accesses by sending the URLs to a command-and-control (C&C) server.
Additionally, the extension periodically requests from a C&C server remote resources that are
executed in the user’s browser. Most of the time, the resources do nothing, allowing the MBE
to appear benign until the botnet operator initiates an attack. This behavior helps explain why
VirusTotal’s 57 anti-virus engines consider the extension to be non-malicious, and why it was on
the Chrome Web Store.
When active, the MBE manipulates Facebook’s DOM with side effects that are detectable
both by the DOM scanner, as well as by users themselves (who subsequently reported issues to
Facebook). As a result, when the botnet began executing malicious payloads, these side effects
provided the first signals of its existence to our system, which resulted in automated classification
of the sample as MALICIOUS.
5e.g. MD5 a369ecc2e8ca5924ddf1639993ffa3aa
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Figure 1.3. Daily proportion of user devices detected with a DOM-based indicator of the botnet,
and the proportion of user devices that have the botnet remediated.
Figure 1.3 shows the detection and remediation of this MBE over time. The x-axis shows
the number of days after the MBE was first detected by Facebook. The y-axis, normalized by
the number of devices scanned daily, shows both the proportion of scanned devices detected as
being infected, and the proportion of devices with the MBE cleaned from their system. The lag
from when an indicator is detected on a device, and when the device performs malware cleanup,
is due to the two processes being independent. In less than a week it peaks while Facebook’s
malware scanner actively cleaned infected devices. After two weeks, almost all extensions had
been removed from the browsers of Facebook’s users.
1.5 System Evaluation
We now evaluate our system for automatically labeling malicious browser extensions
using extension data collected over a period of six weeks, spanning the end of 2016 through
early 2017. We start by characterizing the volume of data our infrastructure processes, focusing
on Chrome and Firefox extensions. The volume underscores the need for an automated system.
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Table 1.1. Collected browser extensions broken down by browser name, status, contained
samples and indicators, and by number of scan sessions reporting a specific type of extension. A
scan session may collect both Firefox and Chrome extensions if both browsers are present on a
given machine, and thus these percentages add up to more than 100%.
All extensions Malicious extensions Extension contents Extracted indicators Scan sessions
# % # % of total JS HTML Total # Malicious (#/%) # %
Chrome extensions 23 376 67.6 1 697 7.3 67 380 720 66 134 1 559 (2.4%) 718 497 96.9
Firefox extensions 11 183 32.4 88 0.8 17 979 16 19 004 609 (3.2%) 257 164 34.7
Total unique 34 559 100.0 1 785 5.2 84 905 733 73 281 1 516 (2.1%) 741 276 100.0
We then show the system in operation and its behavior over time.
1.5.1 Extensions Collected
Table 1.1 shows a high-level breakdown of the browser extensions we collected over
the six-week period. Overall, Facebook’s malware scanner collected a total of 34559 distinct
browser extensions from 741k distinct scan sessions. We uniquely identify a browser extension
by its XPI identifier for Firefox extensions, and by its CRX identifier for Chrome extensions.
Extensions are more popular among Chrome users as the majority of collected distinct extensions
(67.6%) came from Chrome.
As shown in Table 1.1, throughout the six-week period our system extracted more than
85000 unique HTML and JS files, with 79.5% of them originating from Chrome extensions. Note
that a small number of JS files (454 in total) appear both in Chrome and Firefox extensions, and
are cases of libraries like jQuery commonly shared among JS-based applications. Additionally,
three HTML files appear in both Chrome and Firefox extensions, and are related to the Potentially
Unwanted Program (PUP) Conduit.A.
Among the collected extensions, our infrastructure extracted a total of 73281 unique
indicators. Most of these indicators (90%) were embedded in samples extracted from Chrome
extensions. As with the JS files, 9398 indicators overlap across the two types of extensions due
to common references to certain resources like domains, URLs, and email addresses.
For Chrome extensions, we find 2200 (9.4%) of the 23376 total extensions to have been
on Google’s Web Store at least once. The high proportion of extensions likely installed via
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sideloading (90.6%) is not surprising as Facebook’s malware scanner runs on devices suspected
of being infected, and Google removes extensions they consider malicious from the Web Store.
1.5.2 Malicious Extensions Detected
We now consider the methodology for automated MBE labeling we presented in Sec-
tion 1.4.1, and examine its application to the extensions we collected and the files we extracted
during the six-week measurement period.
Of the 34559 extensions from this period, we classified 5.2% of them as malicious. As
expected, attackers clearly target Chrome more often. From the 11183 Firefox extensions, only
0.8% of them are labeled malicious. Yet, of the 23376 Chrome extensions, 7.3% are malicious.
This bias naturally reflects browser market share, as Facebook sees predominantly more traffic
from Chrome and attackers concentrate on the platform most popular with users. Of the malicious
Chrome extensions identified, 24.9% have been accessible on the Web Store at least one time
throughout the measurement period.
The small portion of extracted threat indicators labeled malicious in Table 1.1 (2.1% of
all extracted indicators) highlights the effectiveness of our labeling methodology in trickling up
known badness. The malicious indicators used to label MBE are primarily domains and URIs,
with the exception of a single email address that resulted in labeling one Chrome extension as
malicious.
Figure 1.4 shows the behavior of the automated labeling system over time as it detects
and labels MBEs. Each point represents the number of new extensions labeled as malicious on a
given day (x-axis), even if the extension was first seen on different day. The spike spanning days
32–35 is linearly correlated with the fluctuation in the number of users clearing the malware
checkpoint at the same period. On an average day the system labels 39.5 (median: 37) Chrome
extensions and 2 (median: 1) Firefox extensions as malicious.
In general, identifying new malicious extensions is immediate: for over 90% of newly-
collected browser extensions, the system labels them as MALICIOUS with a median time of 21
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Figure 1.4. The number of unique extensions labeled as malicious each day of the six-week
measurement period.
seconds after collection. However, some extensions are initially labeled benign and are only
later discovered to be malicious when their embedded indicators are associated with abusive
behavior. In our measurement period, we only found 143 (8.0%) extensions that are eventually
labeled MALICIOUS more than 1 day after they are first collected, and these extensions are found
on ≈ 9% of all users cleaned during the measurement period. Delayed discovery is expected
with an indicator-based labeling system as the status of an indicator can change over time, and
we consider the number to be acceptably low for an operational system.
1.6 Evaluating Alternatives
The system evaluation shows that Facebook’s MBE labeling is effective at detecting,
labeling, and cleaning malicious extensions. A related question is whether it is necessary to
create a new system to perform this task. Next we evaluate alternatives to underscore the need for
developing a new system to protect Facebook and its users from large-scale abuse via browser
extensions. For this evaluation, we focus on Chrome extensions since they dominate what
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we encounter on user’s devices. In particular, 2200 extensions once available as “public” or
“unlisted” on the Chrome Web Store, of which Facebook labeled 422 (19.2%) as malicious, and
1778 (80.8%) as unknown. Recall that these are extensions from users that exhibited suspicious
activity on Facebook and triggered an anti-virus scan, so we would expect a greater concentration
of malicious extensions in this smaller set.
1.6.1 VirusTotal
We first use VirusTotal to evaluate whether Facebook can use general databases of
malware to detect malicious extensions. VirusTotal is a popular online system owned by Google
that analyzes malware files using a suite of 57 anti-virus products, and reports which A/V
products label a file as malicious (if any).
We initially use the set of new extensions publicly available on the Chrome Web Store
overlapping with our measurement period. The authors of the Hulk system [50] kindly shared
these extensions with us, and they total 9172 unique CRXs. As a baseline we submitted the
shared public extensions their system collected to VirusTotal. VirusTotal was aware of only 73
(0.8%) of them, and considered only 5 (0.1%) as malicious.
Additionally, out of the 422 MALICIOUS extensions as labeled by Facebook, only 22.7%
are identified as malicious by one or more anti-virus engines. We conclude that a general malware
database like VirusTotal is insufficient for detecting MBEs for sites like Facebook.
1.6.2 Chrome Web Store
Google also has a vested interest in maintaining the health of the Chrome extension
ecosystem, and therefore also actively removes extensions that it determines to be malicious.
Since another option for Facebook would be to rely upon Google’s efforts, as a final step we
quantify the benefits that Facebook’s MBE labeling system is able to provide by focusing on just
its service beyond what Google provides to all Chrome users.
When an extension is removed from the Chrome store, we conservatively assume that
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the extension was removed because Google considered it malicious. Since extensions may be
removed for other reasons (e.g., developers removing their own extensions), this represents an
upper bound of Google’s detection capability. By the end of the measurement period, Google
removed 367 of the 9 172 extensions from the Chrome store (70 MALICIOUS and 297 UNKNOWN
based to our labels).
In addition to cleaning up the malicious extensions, another goal of our MBE labeling
system is to reduce the time that they are active and profitable to attackers. Using the public
user counts listed on the Web Store we estimate that these 70 malicious extensions have been
installed 1009806 times. Of the 70 MBEs, Facebook always labels the extensions as malicious
before Google removes them, with a median difference of 67.3 hours. Thus reducing the median
monetization window of malicious extensions by over 2.8 days.
1.7 Conclusions
Malicious extensions are a vexing problem and one that is challenging to address from
any single vantage point. While browser vendors are in a position to restrict which extensions
are distributed and, in principal, which extensions may be installed, they have limited insight
into which extensions act abusively in the wild. Indeed, some extension’s malicious code is only
loaded at run-time and even then may only be activated for particular sites. Conversely, abused
sites directly experience malicious behaviors but they are not in a position to identify which
extensions are implicated in a given attack because this information is not available through the
Web interface.
In over six weeks of deployment at Facebook our system has identified more than 1700
malicious Chrome and Firefox extensions. Comparing our findings with both contemporaneous
anti-malware detections (as reflected in VirusTotal) and takedowns from the Chrome Web
Store, reveals a considerable detection gap in the existing abuse ecosystem. We hope that by
highlighting this issue and sharing our data we can encourage a broader and more collaborative
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focus on this under-addressed attack vector 6.
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Chapter 2
Following Their Footsteps: Characterizing
Account Automation Abuse and Defenses
In this chapter, we develop a system to disrupt abusive underground services selling
inauthentic actions on Instagram. Similar to our first study (Chapter 1), the actions produced
by these services are observable from the vantage point of an online social network. However,
the corresponding malicious software is not required to run directly on each customer’s device;
making the use of a malware scanner-like approach impractical. As a result, we explore different
intervention techniques to disrupt the abusive actions themselves.
We focus on five popular underground services. From these services, we identify two
techniques used to inflate the social status of a customer’s account: collusion networks and
reciprocity abuse. We then develop a honeypot framework for Instagram that allows us to engage
with abusive services as a customer. Using this framework and signals produced by Instagram,
we measure a number of operational characteristics for each underground service. Lastly, we
develop two controlled interventions to compare the effectiveness of different approaches to
countermeasure. We find underground services are able to attract large clientele, and generate
over $1M in estimated monthly revenue. Additionally, we experimentally demonstrate that
transparent interventions (e.g., blocking actions from a given account automation service)
quickly provokes adversarial adaptation, while deferred interventions (e.g., removing service
actions a day later) is far more likely to go unanswered.
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2.1 Introduction
Social media, as with all forms of mass communication, provides a platform whereby a
single message can reach large audiences. However, the reach of any given message is determined
by the popularity of the user who publishes it. Concretely, users with more followers are able
to reach larger audiences with their posts and thus can be seen as carrying more “weight” in
some abstract social hierarchy. Since this standing is directly monetizable via advertising, it is
unsurprising that this aspect of social media has attracted organized abuse. Indeed, the medium
has engendered a large underground service market that focuses on bypassing the organic nature
of social relationships and instead advertises the ability to create artificially enhanced social
network status in exchange for payment.
In this paper we explore this phenomena in the context of the popular Instagram photo-
sharing service. To wit, searching for “Instagram likes” in a search engine will produce pages of
sites with inducements such as “Buy Instagram Likes from $2.97 only!” or “Instant Instagram
Likes — 100% Real & Genuine Likes”. However, the precise mechanism by which such services
ply their trade is unclear and, in fact, simplistic “bot-based” approaches (whereby a service
creates fake accounts and uses them to initiate social actions to customer content) are easy to
detect and filter. In our work, we focus on the more sophisticated segment of this market, AASs
in which users provide their Instagram credentials to third party actors who, in turn, use those
credentials to perform actions on the user’s behalf in a manner that violates Instagram’s Terms of
Use [42].
We have explored these services through a variety of techniques. Using a broad array
of independent “honeypot accounts” we engaged (on behalf of these accounts) with five large
account automation services: Instalex, Instazood, Followersgratis, Boostgram and Hublaagram.
By requesting a range of “social actions” from each AAS, and then monitoring activity to and
from the associated accounts, we inferred the mechanisms each service uses to achieve its ends.
Notably, we distinguish two distinct techniques — collusion networks and reciprocity abuse —
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used to artificially create social connectivity. Using our service characterizations we were then
able to identify all accounts used by customers of each service. Collecting data on this corpus
over several months, we were able to characterize the dynamics of their customer populations
and the underlying revenue of each business. Finally, we performed controlled experiments to
evaluate different kinds of interventions (e.g., blocking such services from accessing Instagram
vs. removing their actions at a future date) and the reactions each kind of intervention evoked
from the services and their customers.
We believe our work is the most comprehensive study of this kind to date on Instagram,
and that our analysis provides several insights that were not previously understood or lacked
empirical validation in the broader space of social network abuse:
• Social action laundering. We identify two techniques designed to artificially create
social actions while evading traditional detection mechanisms. The first, reciprocity
abuse, leverages the tendency of some users to issue complementary follows or likes in
response to an unknown user following them or liking their content. This reciprocity
effect allows services to quickly inflate the follower or like counts of their customers
by automating outbound actions to a curated set of recipients.
The second approach, collusion networks, uses the entirety of a service’s population to
orchestrate the exchange of social actions. Thus, each customer account is used to issue
follows or likes to other customers, and they in turn receive inbound actions from yet
other customers (similar, in principal, to the notion of a mix network [16]).
• Commercial scale. We find that these services are quite successful as business entities
and we estimate the gross revenue among three of the five AASs alone to be over $1M
per month. Moreover, we show that long-term customers (i.e., customers who repeatedly
contract for services over multiple months) provide the lion’s share of these proceeds (i.e.,
that the core set of customers is stable and customer churn is modest).
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• Intervention impacts. We experimentally demonstrate that transparent interventions (e.g.,
blocking actions from a given account automation service) quickly provokes adversarial
adaptation, while deferred interventions (e.g., removing service actions a day later) is far
more likely to go unanswered. Somewhat unintuitively, our results suggest that related
abuse interventions will be most effective and long-lived precisely when they do not visibly
undermine the business model of the abusive service.
In the remainder of this paper we provide background on how such social networks
operate and are abused, describe the set of AASs we explored, and provide a detailed description
of our measurement methodology. We provide an analysis of both user dynamics and service
revenue, and then describe a series of controlled intervention experiments that explore how
for-profit service abuse businesses respond to different varieties of disruption.
2.2 Background
Online social networks (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Youtube, Snapchat, etc.) are
targeted by abusers that engage in activities spanning from selling fake actions to hijacking user
accounts. We are not the first to identify this phenomenon, and other researchers have charac-
terized a range of such practices that we build on in our own work. Javed et al. characterized
generic traffic exchange services that provide customers with inflated view counts—including
for social media—from large pools of IP addresses, and find many exchanges which pay users
in return for views to their content [49]. This work establishes both the commercial nature of
such abuse and the use of live humans as traffic sources. Hooi et al. develop a bipartite graph
algorithm to detect abusive actions on the Twitter follower-followee graph, where miscreants
may camouflage their abusive actions by producing actions to non-customers [37]. Again, this
work identifies the use of organic (i.e., non-bot) accounts as a critical challenge in social network
abuse and uses statistical techniques to try to distinguish legitimate and illigitmate actions from
such accounts.
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Other researchers have tried to overcome this issue by using honeypot accounts to
crisply identify abuse targeting across a range of social networks including MySpace, Twitter,
and Facebook [54, 83, 88, 1, 93]. Moreover, in some cases, this data has then been used to
successfully train classifiers to identify those accounts complicit in collusion networks [1, 88].
Our work builds on both of these techniques—the use of honeypots to obtain abuse data and
using this data to train abuse classifiers—in our analysis of Instagram abuse.
The honeypot approach has also been combined with active purchasing from third-
party services to investigate commercial abuse. For example, De Cristofaro et al’s analysis of
Facebook services [19] and Stringhini et al’s analysis of Twitter following services [84] both use
this approach and characterize the nature of the fraudulent social networks they find. Our work
is distinct, not only due to the different social network examined (Instagram), but also because
we focus on more complex (i.e., non-bot) forms of abuse in our work. As well, we are able to
provide a grounded analysis about service revenue that informs how we consider the nature of
the threat and focused experiments exploring the impact of different interventions.
Mislove et al. identified the existence of high degrees of reciprocated actions within
online social networks (e.g., Flicker, YoutTube, etc.) which, a decade later, forms the basis for the
reciprocity abuse we identify in this work [63]. Finally, most closely related to our work is that
of Farooqi et al. who describe a collusion network abusing third-party application OAuth tokens
on Facebook, and the results of large-scale network-level blocking of the organizations behind
this activity [25]. Our work brings a related analysis to a distinct social network and extends
it by analyzing reciprocity abuse as well as collusions networks, quantifying the underlying
business and revenue model for multiple abuse groups, and performing active experiments with
finer-grained (i.e., account-level) interventions.
For this paper, we focus squarely on Instagram, a popular online social network structured
around sharing and discussing photos posted by its 800 million users [41]. In normal use, each
Instagram user can upload photos and videos, apply visual filters and tag photos with hashtags.
A user’s followers will see the media the user has posted, and can interact by liking the media
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and posting comments. Thus, users with more followers will have their content exposed to a
broader audience and will receive on average more interactions.
Typically, differences in social status (e.g., the number of likes per photo, followers,
etc.) are an organic byproduct of each user’s own authentic activity. However, in addition to the
implicit psychological factors that drive users to desire increased social standing, there can be
strong economic incentives as well. Notably, after reaching a social status commonly referred to
as an “influencer”, outside businesses may offer to pay users thousands of dollars in exchange
for posts (e.g., for marketing purposes) [67, 61]. It is a popular belief in this community that,
to become an influencer, a user of Instagram needs an account with both a high engagement
(i.e., a large number of other Instagram users that interact with posted content), and thousands of
followers [61]. The potential for such inducements leads some users to pursue increased social
status via abusive means, and gives rise to third-party services that perform this function for a
fee. Indeed, such services formalize this notion and promote a metric called the “engagement
rate” to evaluate the quality (and hence potential profitability) of an influencer [45]. They argue
that users should try to maximize this metric:
ER=
Number of likes & comments
Number of followers
and commonly offer to manipulate one or more of its components as a key aspect of their service
offering (with one such service claiming that each $1 spent produces a return of $6 in marketing
revenue).
One approach for achieving this end is to create a range of synthetic Instagram accounts
and use them to follow the accounts of paying customers, like their content, and so on.
However, this kind of purely synthetic account manipulation can be easy to detect. Indeed, over
the last year Instagram has worked to disrupt a range of popular bot services including Instagress,
MassPlanner, PeerBoost, InstaPlus, and FanHarvest [31, 60, 66, 86]. The more sophisticated
players in this ecosystem perform “account automation” whereby their customers provide access
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to their Instagram login credentials, and the service performs actions on their behalf. In fact,
Instagram provides a public OAuth-based API that allows a Web site to perform actions on behalf
of users that grant permission. However, this API is rate limited in a manner that precludes broad
abusive use. Thus, most commercial account automation services bypass these limitations by
reverse engineering the private API used by the Instagram mobile client and generating spoofed
requests to appear as valid mobile client actions.
2.3 Account Automation Services
Based on our observations, AASs use two distinct approaches to achieve their ends:
(i) Reciprocity Abuse and (ii) Collusion Networks. The former aims to provide authentic actions
(i.e., likes, follows, etc.) to their customer’s Instagram account, while the latter provides
customers with inauthentic actions to their Instagram account. In this section we describe each
approach, and then detail the particular set of services we studied in this effort.
2.3.1 Reciprocity Abuse
Reciprocity Abuse AASs provide their customers with organic actions from other Insta-
gram user accounts by exploiting the concept of social reciprocity. For example, when Instagram
user A1 receives an (inbound) action from Instagram user B2, A1 will be notified in real-time
about B2’s action, and A1 may reciprocate by performing an action to user B2. This “you follow
me, I follow you” behavior is an organic response taken by some subset of Instagram users.
Reciprocity Abuse AASs abuse this behavior by automating large numbers of (outbound) actions
from their customer’s Instagram account in the hope that a subset of users receiving an action
will return the favor in kind — thus providing their customer with inbound actions, such as
follows.
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2.3.2 Collusion Networks
By contrast, Collusion Network AASs provide their customers with inbound inauthentic
actions on their Instagram accounts. A collusion network is a group of Instagram accounts used
in concert to orchestrate actions to one another. Accounts participating in the collusion network
will produce outbound actions to other accounts in the network, as well as receive inbound
actions from the network. Customers of Collusion Network AASs are hoping to strictly increase
the number of actions on their Instagram account and they are willing to have their account used
in the same manner on behalf of others to serve this goal.
2.3.3 Studied services
We study five popular AASs in detail that we discovered through a combination of search-
ing popular underground forums for popular recommendations from the community, together
with repeated complaints from Instagram users caused by unsolicited AAS advertisements. Three
use the reciprocity abuse approach (Instalex, Instazood and Boostgram), while the other two
implement collusion networks (Hublaagram and Followersgratis). For each service, we explored
its Web site in fall 2017 to understand the registration process, what features are offered, and the
advertised business model [43, 46, 8, 39, 29]. Figure 2.1, for example, shows a screenshot of
the Instalex customer control panel. During this process, we also discovered that the Instalex
and Instazood services were independently operated franchisees of the same parent organization
(which offers franchising services ranging from $1,990 to $30,990 per month [44]). Since they
appear to be operated independently, we evaluate these two services separately until Section 2.5
where we combine the two services when we cannot separate their actions.
Registration Process
Both Reciprocity Abuse AASs and Collusion Network AASs produce automated activity
from the Instagram accounts of their customers. Therefore, a required step when registering for
any AAS is for the customer to provide their Instagram account credentials (e.g., in contrast to
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Figure 2.1. Instalex Web site providing an example account control panel with action counts
performed on Instagram.
abuse methods where the AASs depends on the ability to use customer OAuth tokens [25]). By
sharing their Instagram credentials the customer gives an AAS full control over their Instagram
account, while resetting the password revokes AAS access to the account.
Table 2.1 shows the different AASs by name, service type, and what services are available
to customers. All offer like and follow services, 60% offer comment and unfollow services,
and 40% offer post services. It comes as no surprise that every AAS offers at a minimum likes
and follows as these are the most frequent actions on Instagram. Some AASs provide comment
and post services as additional ways for their customers to attract other Instagram users to
engage with their content. Lastly, all Reciprocity Abuse AASs provide unfollow services that
allow their customers to remove the outbound follows performed by the AAS in an effort to
retain only the inbound follows they receive.
Many Reciprocity Abuse AASs allow their customers to target groups of Instagram
accounts that will receive automated actions, allowing their customers to obtain reciprocated
actions from users with common interests. Customers can provide either a list of Instagram
users, or a list of hashtags to narrow the accounts that a AAS will interact with. When signed
into a Collusion Network AAS, customers are typically given the option to request a specific
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Table 2.1. Services offered to customers of Reciprocity Abuse AASs and Collusion Network
AASs.
Reciprocity Abuse AASs
Service Like Follow Comment Post Unfollow
Instalex F F F F
Instazood F F F F F
Boostgram F F F F
Collusion Network AASs
Service Like Follow Comment Post Unfollow
Hublaagram F F F
Followersgratis F F
type and quantity of inbound actions (e.g., 2,000 likes, etc.) to other customers of the network,
but cannot specify the interests of accounts they receive actions from.
AAS Business Model
The primary revenue source across the studied AASs is customer payments for the
services they offer.1 In turn, there are two different techniques used by AASs to attract customers
in the hope that they become paying customers: trial periods, and free services.
First-time customers of Reciprocity Abuse AASs are commonly offered a free variable-
length trial period. During the trial period customers have access to all of the service’s features.
However, as soon as the trial period expires the service is discontinued, and if the customer
wants to continue service they are required to pay. Reciprocity Abuse AASs have a relatively
straightforward cost structure where customers pay for each of their Instagram accounts to gain
full use of the service for a specified time period. Table 2.2 presents the free and paid service
options for customers of the Reciprocity Abuse AASs we study.
Collusion Network AASs offer customers the ability to periodically request small quan-
tities of actions onto their Instagram account for “free”. Soon after a customer provides their
Instagram credentials the service will begin to use the account in the collusion network. Hublaa-
1There is also a minor revenue stream arising from advertisements shown to customers, but it does not appear to
be significant by comparison (Section 2.5.2).
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Table 2.2. For Reciprocity Abuse AAS we show the free trial length, the minimum number of
days that service can be purchased for, and the corresponding cost per Instagram account.
Service Trial Days Min Paid Days Cost
Instalex 7 days 7 $3.15
Instazood 3 days 1 $0.34
Boostgram 3 days 30 $99
Table 2.3. All per-account costs for Hublaagram services. Hublaagram allows customers to pay
a one-time fee that prevents their Instagram account from participating in the collusion network.
Services with an immediate duration are applied as fast as possible to a single post, and services
with a month duration have the purchased quantity of likes applied to each new photo posted
on the account throughout the month.
Description Cost Duration
No collusion network $15 Life
2,000 Likes $10 Immediate
5,000 Likes $20 Immediate
10,000 likes $25 Immediate
250−500 Likes $20 Month
500−1,000 Likes $30 Month
1,000−2,000 Likes $40 Month
2,000−4,000 Likes $70 Month
gram provides free likes, follows, and comments, while Followersgratis only offers free
follows. Free service, though, is rate-limited; Hublaagram, for instance, has a 30-minute
timeout between requests. Naturally, both Collusion Network AASs encourage customers to pay
money to receive a larger quantity of actions. We present the different paid service options for
Hublaagram and Followersgratis in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.
2.4 User Experience
In this section we evaluate the experience of using Account Automation Services from a
user’s perspective using a collection of fully-instrumented honeypot accounts.
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Table 2.4. The Followersgratis payment options. With likes, customers who select the less
expensive option receive likes from Instagram accounts located around the world on five
different photos. The more expensive like option provides likes from Instagram accounts
located in Indonesia, and the likes are spread across ten photos. The duration for likes is
specified explicitly on the Followersgratis Web site without explanation.
Description Cost Duration
500 Follows (300 free likes) $3.15 1 Day
1,000 Follows (500 free likes) $5.25 1 Day
500 Likes (250 free likes) $2.10 Instant
500 Likes (500 free likes) $5.25 Fast
2.4.1 Methodology
To identify abusive actions generated by the AASs, we registered multiple distinct
honeypot accounts with each service described in Section 2.3.3. Thus, for each account, we
register it with an AAS, request that the service perform either inbound or outbound actions
on the account, and then monitor the resulting actions. Since they neither generate nor receive
organic actions, honeypot accounts are particularly useful because we can attribute all activity
to the linked AAS. We describe our methodology for using honeypot accounts in more detail
below.
Account Types
We developed a honeypot account framework to programmatically manage a large number
of Instagram accounts. Our framework supports campaign-specific accounts, account creation,
posting content, deletion, and data collection of all inbound and outbound actions on the account.
When deleting a honeypot account, all actions to or from the account are eventually removed
from Instagram.
For each service, we created two different types of honeypot accounts to determine if
AASs differentiate between fake or real-looking Instagram accounts (they do not), and if there is
a difference between reciprocated action rates from Instagram users that receive an outbound
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action from AASs (there is; more below in Section 2.4.3).
The two types of honeypot accounts we register are “empty” and “lived-in” accounts.
Empty accounts contain the minimum information required to use all of the AASs that we study.
In particular, we populate honeypot accounts with 10 or more photos from one of the following
categories: dogs, cats, lizards, and food. Lived-in accounts, in addition to having uploaded
photos, are fully populated Instagram accounts with a profile picture, biography, and name, all
unique. Lived-in accounts follow 10−20 high-profile Instagram accounts (>1M followers), but
do not themselves have followers when created. Beyond enrolling them in the AAS services, we
do not use them to perform actions on Instagram after being created.
Account Registration
We registered 10 honeypot accounts for every service type offered by each AASs listed
in Table 2.1, specifying that the account be used only for that service type. For example, as
Instalex offers three different services, we registered 30 accounts in the service. Among each
set of 10 accounts, nine are empty and one is lived-in. In total we registered over 150 honeypot
accounts during the course of a month of manual registration effort. Moreover, some of our
accounts engaged with the free services offered by each AAS while others explicitly paid for
contracted services. For AASs that require target information for particular actions (e.g., targets
of likes and follows), we created a static list of hashtags and Instagram accounts that could
be used in common. We chose relatively high-profile hashtags and Instagram accounts (e.g.,
having more than 1M followers) to reduce the impact of the temporary actions produced from our
honeypot accounts. We also made a point to use a diverse set of commercial and residential IP
addresses when accessing each AAS’s site in the unlikely event that any of the services actively
monitor and correlate connections to their site. Finally, we deleted our honeypot accounts after
the measurement period, which removed all of their actions from Instagram.
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Attribution
When using honeypot accounts with AASs, we attribute the activity on those accounts
solely to their involvement in the AASs. To rule out the possibility that the activity could be due
to other users of Instagram, we used a separate set of 50 inactive honeypot accounts to establish
a baseline of background activity on Instagram. The inactive accounts are not registered with an
AAS, and we never used them to produce actions that are visible to other users of Instagram.
For each account we similarly uploaded at least 10 photos at the time of creation. We
then actively monitored whether any inbound action (i.e., likes, follows, etc.) took place on
these accounts. For the duration of our study, we did not observe any activity on any of the
inactive honeypot accounts. As a result, for the honeypot accounts we register with AASs we
attribute all activity on those accounts to their involvement with the services.
2.4.2 How Accounts Are Used
Using the honeypot accounts, we examine how AASs use the accounts registered with
their services.
Since customers provide their Instagram credentials to an AAS during registration (Sec-
tion 2.3.3), it is possible for the AAS to abuse the Instagram account to produce additional,
potentially undesired actions. We compared the types of actions we requested with the types
of actions the services actually performed with our accounts (e.g., when requesting likes does
a service use the account for anything other than like actions?). The services all perform as
advertised. Across the AASs we study, they only perform actions of the type we requested, and
no AASs used our accounts to produce visible un-requested actions.
In later analyses in Section 2.5, such as estimating revenue, it is important to distinguish
between users using the free trial periods on services and those users paying money for service.
Although the services advertise the lengths of their trial periods (Table 2.2), we also experimen-
tally evaluated their durations using the honeypot accounts. Trial service starts immediately, with
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our accounts becoming active within minutes of requesting free service. And with one exception,
we confirmed that free trial service lasts for the advertised period, and that activity with accounts
stops no more than 12 hours beyond the expected end time. Instazood, however, advertises a
three-day trial period, yet all of our honeypot accounts received seven days of trial service. As a
result, for Instazood we assume that trial period activity is seven days.
2.4.3 Quantifying Reciprocation
As a final experiment we use our honeypot accounts to measure the probability that an
outbound like or follow will spontaneously generate a reciprocated action. Previous work has
shown how collusion networks use their control over the accounts in the network to serve as both
the source and target of actions [25]. In contrast, Reciprocity Abuse AASs fundamentally rely
upon natural social behavior in online networks to fulfill their customer requests. As discussed
in Section 2.3.1, these services produce outbound actions from user accounts under their control,
but the targets of these actions are other Instagram accounts that are not under the control of
the service. The underlying assumption is that, for each action, there is some probability that
the target of the action will naturally reciprocate with a similar action. With a sufficiently high
volume of outbound actions, these services can then organically induce reciprocating actions to
satisfy their customer requests.
Table 2.5 shows the probability of receiving a reciprocated action given an outbound
like or follow for the three Reciprocity Abuse AASs. We separate the results for the two
different kinds of honeypot accounts, empty (E) and lived-in (L). For example, generating an
outbound like with our empty Boostgram honeypot accounts has a 1.5% chance of inducing
a reciprocating like and a 0.1% chance of inducing a reciprocating follow. These results
quantify the reciprocity effect of users on Instagram, and from them we make a number of
observations.
First, the reciprocation rates are for the most part very consistent across the services.
Although Instalex and Instazood are franchises of the same service, they also exhibit recipro-
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Table 2.5. The probability of receiving a reciprocated inbound action given an outbound action
of a specific type. For each service, we show the reciprocation ratio for both empty (E) and
lived-in (L) honeypot accounts.
Outbound Inbound
Service Likes Follows
Boostgram (E) Likes 1.5% 0.1%
Instalex (E) Likes 2.1% 1.4%
Instazood (E) Likes 2.1% 0.2%
Boostgram (L) Likes 3.9% 0.2%
Instalex (L) Likes 3.7% 1.8%
Instazood (L) Likes 3.5% 0.4%
Boostgram (E) Follows 0.0% 10.3%
Instalex (E) Follows 0.0% 12.8%
Instazood (E) Follows 0.0% 13.0%
Boostgram (L) Follows 0.0% 12.0%
Instalex (L) Follows 0.0% 13.7%
Instazood (L) Follows 0.0% 16.1%
cation rates that are similar with those on Boostgram. These results are consistent with these
services tapping into fundamental underlying online social behavior on Instagram. Moreover, the
reciprocation rates are relatively high for follows. For just 6–10 outbound follow actions, our
honeypot accounts receive a new inbound follow from a real user. (In Section 2.5.3, we show
that the services appear to specifically target users who are more likely to respond to inbound
follows to increase the probability of reciprocation.)
The one anomaly is inbound follows to outbound likes on Instalex, which has a
reciprocation rate many times greater than the other services. Exploring further, though, we
found no significant features in the accounts targeted by Instalex compared to the other services
that might explain the difference: The inbound actions come from hundreds of autonomous
systems, the time between when the actions take place and when the honeypot account was
registered in the service is uniformly distributed throughout the trial period, the inbound actions
come from dozens of countries, etc. As a result, we currently do not have an explanation for this
one difference.
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Second, users primarily reciprocate with the same action, e.g., Instagram users reciprocate
with a like when receiving a like from one of our accounts. Much less often, users will
reciprocate to an outgoing like by following one of our accounts (an order of magnitude less
often for Boostgram and Instazood). And users never reciprocate with likes when followed
by one of our accounts.
Finally, Instagram users are sensitive to the differences in honeypot accounts. Confirming
expectations, empty accounts have a significantly smaller probability of receiving reciprocal
inbound actions than lived-in accounts, particularly for likes. Lived-in accounts range from
1.6× as likely on Instazood to 2.6× as likely on Boostgram to generate inbound likes. This
difference confirms the utility of more realistic honeypot accounts.
2.5 Business Perspective
Our honeypot accounts gave us insight into the AASs from a user’s perspective. They
were also valuable in providing us with ground-truth on AAS activity, which we were then able
to use to identify all activity generated by all Instagram accounts used by the AASs. Based on
features gathered from our honeypot accounts, such as the type of action (e.g., like, follow,
account login, etc.), commonly tracked information about the client (e.g., IP address, ASN, etc.),
and additional signals produced within Instagram, we can identify the actions initiated by each
AAS. The signals produced by Instagram identify abusive services, including the AASs we
study during the time of our measurement. While Instagram believes that their signals accurately
characterize the entire activity of an AAS, we do not have a way to verify completeness and, as
such, the levels of abuse we characterize in this section constitute a lower bound. Throughout
our study, though, we never detect any changes in the signals tracked by Instagram for our
honeypot accounts. We also periodically register additional trial honeypot accounts in each AAS
as another method for observing the tracked account signals; these signals are consistent with
our original honeypot accounts and also do not change during the course of our study (we delete
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these accounts immediately after the AAS starts generating activity on them).
In this section we analyze every action that takes place on Instagram originating from the
AASs we study over a 90-day period in late 2017. This rich data set allows us to characterize
the magnitude of abuse and revenue generated from AASs. We also present the types of actions
performed by each service, as well as the users targeted by these actions to understand how
different AASs select their targets.
Note that, for the remainder of the paper, we combine activity from Instalex and Instazood
since we cannot differentiate actions performed by individual franchises (Section 2.3.3). To
minimize confusion, we refer to their combined activity as “Insta*”. Additionally, we exclude
Followersgratis from the remaining analyses as the service was already well-policed by pre-
existing abuse detection systems that prevent high volumes of abuse originating from a small
number of IP addresses. As a result, activity generated by Followersgratis has very limited
impact on Instagram in practice.
2.5.1 Customer Base
We explore a range of account-based measurements that help us better understand AAS
operating characteristics.
Popularity. How popular are these services? Table 2.6 shows the number of Instagram
users who were active in each AAS during our measurement period. Demand for these services
is large: Boostgram has more than 10,000 users, Insta* an order of magnitude more, and
Hublaagram just over a million. One explanation for Hublaagram’s much larger popularity is
that it offers prolonged free features compared to the other AASs, and users naturally prefer
no-fee services.
Since nothing constrains users from engaging with multiple services, we looked at how
many Instagram users enroll their account in more than one service. Overall, account overlap is
small. Fewer than 200 accounts generate any activity in the three AASs, 1,963 participate in
two distinct Reciprocity Abuse AASs, and 4,485 accounts participate in at least one Reciprocity
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Table 2.6. Customers participating in each AAS over a 90-day period. Long-term customers
of Reciprocity Abuse AASs are active beyond a trial period, and long-term Collusion Network
AAS customers request service for more than four days.
Service Customers Long-term Short-term
Insta* 121,661 41,891 (34%) 79,770 (66%)
Boostgram 11,959 3,975 (33%) 7,984 (67%)
Hublaagram 1,008,127 501,428 (50%) 506,699 (50%)
Abuse AAS as well as the Hublaagram collusion network. In these cases, nearly all are users
experimenting with free trials (fewer than 100 accounts are long-term customers of any AAS).
Table 2.6 also breaks down the active customers into short-term and long-term categories.
For Insta* and Boostgram — both of which rely on reciprocity — we define long-term users as
those who participate for more than seven consecutive days, strictly longer than the length of the
free trial period (Section 2.4.2).2 For Hublaagram, the collusion network, we define long-term
users as those who request service for more than four consecutive days. All other users are
considered short-term users who only briefly engage with the services and then disappear.
One third of customers of both Insta* and Boostgram are long-term, while nearly half of
Hublaagram users are long-term. Having a significant fraction of long-term uses is not surprising
since, again, they offer extended services without a fee. And by far most of the actions attempted
by the services come from long-term users. For Insta* and Boostgram, 91.6% and 89.7% of
actions are from long-term users, and for Hublaagram it is 92.3%.
User Stability. Are AASs growing in popularity over time, or does the market appear
to be saturated? Over the course of three months, we examine the rate at which new long-term
users appear in each service (birth rate), the rate at which long-term users appear to have dropped
out of the service (death rate), and the daily number of active long-term users in each service.
Both Boostgram and Hublaagram shrank slightly over our measurement period, losing a small
percentage of long-term users over time (death rate slightly higher than birth rate). In contrast,
2If an Insta* customer pays for exactly seven days of service but does not use the free trial in our measurement
period, then our methodology incorrectly labels the customer as a short-term account. We expect such behavior to
be infrequent, though.
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Table 2.7. The operating location for each AAS as reported on their Web site and the ASNs
from service activity originates.
Service Operating Country ASN Location
Insta* Russia USA
Boostgram United States USA
Hublaagram Indonesia GBR, USA
Insta* grew in size by more than 10% and the number of active long-term users per day steadily
increased over the period.
Similarly, we measure the probability that a new AAS user will become a long-term
user within the month they begin service. We find the long-term user conversion rate in the first
month of service to be stable across our measurement period for each AAS, although the rates
vary across services: the conversion rate for Boostgram is 12%, Insta* is 21%, and Hublaagram
is 37%. It is not surprising that Boostgram has the lowest new long-term user conversion rate
since they have the most expensive service (Table 2.2).
Service and Customer Location Where are customers geographically located? For
each AASs we compare the country location of the service with the location of its customers.
We determine the location of a service using geographic information reported on its Web site and
the ASNs from which service activity originates. We define the location of an Instagram account
to be the most frequent country used to login to the account, as determined by Instagram’s IP
geolocation system.3
Table 2.7 shows the locations of each AAS, and Figure 2.2 shows the countries that
account for 5% or more of the user population. For each AAS, the advertised country is also
where the largest number of Instagram accounts are located. Insta* has most of their users in the
“other” category, which we suspect is an artifact of undiscovered franchised services around the
world (Section 2.3.3).
3Note that, while AASs might affect their customer’s geolocation by logging in to their Instagram accounts, they
do so infrequently.
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Figure 2.2. Percentage of AAS customer Instagram account locations by country. “OTHER”
includes all countries that contribute less than 5% to the total distribution.
2.5.2 Revenue
To estimate the gross monthly revenue of each service we classify the accounts partici-
pating in each service into free and paid accounts.
For Reciprocity Abuse AASs we know the account is paid when it is active in the AAS
for longer than the trial period (Section 2.3.3). For each paid account we estimate the amount
of money paid to the service by measuring the number of days the account is active beyond a
trial period, and use the minimum paid duration as a way to convert the number of days active
into money paid to the AAS. For Insta* we provide an estimated revenue range as each service
(Instalex and Instazood) has a different cost and minimum service duration even though they are
franchises of the same company. Table 2.8 shows our estimate of the monthly gross revenue for
Reciprocity Abuse AASs. On average each service has a significant gross revenue approaching
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Table 2.8. Estimated monthly gross revenue for Reciprocity Abuse AASs.
Service Accounts Service Fee Revenue
Boostgram 3,016 $99/month $298,584
Insta* (Low) 25,122 $0.34/day $195,017
Insta* (High) 25,122 $3.15/week $223,785
$200,000 to $300,000 per month.
For the collusion network Hublaagram, distinguishing between free and paid accounts
is more challenging and requires a more detailed accounting methodology. Since customers
can request free service for an unbounded number of days, we cannot distinguish between free
or paid solely based on the number of days they are active as we could with the other AASs.
Instead, to estimate Hublaagram’s monthly gross revenue we developed a model tailored to their
cost structure (Table 2.3).
To identify accounts that pay a one-time fee to not participate in the collusion network,
we count those accounts that only receive inbound actions from Hublaagram and never produce
outbound actions from the service. In our measurement period, 24,420 active accounts paid the
one-time fee to prevent their accounts from being used in the collusion network.
There are multiple like services offered by Hublaagram. To identify paying customers,
for each user we count the hourly median number of likes generated by Hublaagram across each
photo on the customer’s account. Using observations from paid honeypot accounts (Section 2.4.1)
in Hublaagram, we know that paid customers exceed the 160 likes/hour rate-limit imposed by
Hublaagram for free customers. Therefore, we count accounts that have ever received more than
160 likes in an hour on any of their photos as paid since they must have purchased one of the
like services.
For accounts classified as paid, we then distinguish among the one-time and monthly
like services. To identify customers that purchase one-time likes for a single photo, we count
the number of photos that have more than 2,000 likes for accounts that have a daily median
of fewer than 250 likes per photo. Similarly, to identify customers that pay for monthly like
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services, we count accounts that have a median value of likes/photo that fall within the various
tiers of Hublaagram’s service options (e.g., we estimate an account with a median likes/photo
ratio in the 250–500 range to be paying $20/month). We identify just 182 users who paid for
one-time likes, while 31,901 paid for one of the monthly like services.
Lastly, when a customer visits Hublaagram’s Web site to request free actions, they
may be shown multiple advertisements that generate additional revenue for the service. The
site publishes pop-under advertisements4 from the PopAds network [71]. To increase their
ad revenue, Hublaagram’s Web site occasionally shows visitors pop-under advertisements on
every Web site interaction (e.g., clicking on a radio button triggers an advertisement in a new
window).5 Hublaagram provides ≈ 40 follows or ≈ 80 likes per free service request, limited
to two requests per hour. We estimate the number of advertisement impressions by counting
multiples of 40 follows or 80 likes performed by Hublaagram. We conservatively exclude
paying customer accounts in this analysis as we are unable to differentiate paid or free like
actions, and assume that for each request only a single advertisement was shown since we do
not know how the customer interacts with the Web site. Based on PopAd’s revenue model,
we estimate that for every 1,000 impressions (CPM) Hublaagram receives between $0.60 and
$4.00 since their customers are located around the world (Figure 2.2) and geolocation affects
CPM [7, 23, 71].
Table 2.9 lists the number of paid Hublaagram accounts in each of the service categories
and their contribution to overall Hublaagram’s revenue.6 Considering Hublaagram’s large user
base, the fraction of paid users is small. While Hublaagram had over a million active users within
the measurement period, and half of them were long-term users, only about 5% of users paid fees
for some kind of service beyond the free options that Hublaagram offers. Even so, Hublaagram
still has an impressive estimated gross revenue of well over $800,000 per month. Most of
4Pop-under ads typically appear when closing a Web page.
5Hublaagram’s Web site shows between 1–4 pop-under ads per free service request.
6Fewer than 20 customers mapped to the 5,000 or 10,000 one-time like service categories, and we exclude
them from Table 2.9 since their revenue contribution is negligible.
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Table 2.9. Gross revenue estimates for Hublaagram. The “No outbound” service has a one-time
fee for the lifetime of the account, and the remaining services have monthly fees.
Service Accounts Fee Revenue
No outbound 24,420 $15 $366,300
Total One-Time Revenue $366,300
Service Count Fee Revenue
Ads Shown
Low CPM 5,769,537 0.06¢ $3,461
High CPM 5,769,537 0.4¢ $23,078
Likes Once
2,000 182 $10 $1,820
Likes / Photo
250−500 11,249 $20 $224,980
500−1,000 18,009 $30 $540,270
1,000−2,000 2,488 $40 $99,520
2,000−4,000 155 $70 $10,850
Total Monthly Revenue $880,901 – $900,518
Hublaagram’s monthly revenue derives from customers paying for 250–1,000 likes/photo per
month, while few customers purchase one-time likes for a single photo (reflecting how poor a
bargain that option is). Similarly, while many ads are shown, we estimate that the resulting ad
revenue is dwarfed by the other revenue sources.
Interestingly, users do care about not receiving fake outbound actions from other accounts
in the collusion network, and are willing to pay for preventing it. Of the active accounts in our
observation period, such users collectively paid Hublaagram more than $350,000 in one-time
fees.
A related question is if the majority of monthly AAS revenue is generated from customers
that pay for service only once, or ones that renew. Table 2.10 shows the fraction of new paid
customers versus customers that have paid for service before. Across all services, the majority of
gross revenue is generated from AAS customers who repeatedly pay for service.
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Table 2.10. Breakdown of revenue between new and existing paying customers for each AAS
over one month.
Service New Preexisting
Insta* 31.4% 68.6%
Boostgram 10.8% 89.2%
Hublaagram 16.5% 83.5%
Table 2.11. Action types performed from each AAS over a 90-day period. We normalize each
value by the total number actions performed by each service.
Action Insta* Boostgram Hublaagram
Likes 30.8% 64.0% 63.0%
Follows 38.6% 19.3% 35.3%
Comments 5.6% 0% 1.7%
Unfollows 25.0% 16.7% 0%
2.5.3 Activity Generated
We now analyze the actions performed by each AAS to understand which types are most
popular among users, and how Reciprocity Abuse AASs target specific kinds of users to obtain
better organic reciprocation rates.
Table 2.11 shows the proportion of action types performed by each AAS throughout
the measurement period. Likes are the most requested action for Boostgram and Hublaagram,
1.8–3.4×more popular than follows. Insta* customers request more follows to likes (1.3×).
Across all AASs, comments and posts are infrequent, suggesting that customers of these AAS
either acquire these actions through other means, or do not consider them as valuable. The
Reciprocity AASs perform a significant number of unfollows, which users can optionally
request to happen automatically after a follow.
Reciprocity AASs depend on general Instagram users to generate reciprocating follows
and likes to their customers’ requests. As a result, if these services can target Instagram users
who are more likely to reciprocate, they can more easily meet their customer demands. To
evaluate whether Reciprocity Abuse AASs have any biases in the accounts that they target, we
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compare accounts targeted by actions from AASs with accounts from all of Instagram as a
baseline. Specifically, we compare the following and follower counts of a random sample of
1,000 accounts that received an action from AASs with a random sample of 1,000 from all
Instagram accounts that receive actions during our measurement period.
For both metrics we see differences in the account populations. Figure 2.3 shows a
CDF of the number of Instagram accounts followed by the accounts in each sample (account
out-degree). For example, the median AAS accounts have a higher out-degree than a random
Instagram account: Boostgram accounts follow 684 other Instagram accounts and Insta* accounts
follow 554.5, while the median sample of all of Instagram accounts follow just 465. Similarly,
Figure 2.4 shows a CDF of the number of followers of the accounts in each sample (account
in-degree). By this metric, the distributions have even more pronounced differences: The
accounts targeted by the Reciprocity AASs have significantly fewer followers than the broader
Instagram population. Boostgram and Insta* accounts are followed by just a median of 498 and
384 accounts, respectively, whereas the median sample of all Instagram accounts are followed
by 796 accounts.
These results indicate that the Reciprocity AASs do have a selection bias in the accounts
that they target, selecting for accounts with higher out-degree and much lower in-degree to
increase the likelihood of a reciprocated action. In other words, accounts targeted by the AASs
are already inclined to follow other users, but have far fewer followers themselves and, as a
result, are presumably more open to reciprocating when targeted.
2.6 Interventions
Having characterized AAS from a user perspective and as business entities, we subse-
quently actively engage with the abusive services by deploying countermeasures. Our goal is not
to completely disrupt the AASs immediately, but rather we start by evaluating how AASs react
to interventions. This understanding can then provide insight for improving operational abuse
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Figure 2.3. CDFs of the number of users followed by each target for three samples of accounts:
1,000 random accounts targeted by the two Reciprocity AASs, and 1,000 random Instagram
users.
detection and prevention systems. While Instagram is in a position to identify all AAS customer
accounts, blocking these accounts is not a desirable outcome since Instagram users still use them
to initiate legitimate actions that should not be blocked (even while they are also enrolled in an
AAS). Additionally, as our interventions show in Section 2.6.3, AASs quickly attempt to evade
interventions. As such, we derive a new signal for performing countermeasures (Section 2.6.2),
rather than relying on the signals used to identify AAS customers in the first place. We perform
two interventions, first on a narrow set of AAS activity over a six-week period, and a second on
a broad set of AAS activity over a subsequent two-week period.
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Figure 2.4. CDFs of the number of followers for a random sample of 1,000 targets selected by
two third-party applications compared to a sample of 1,000 Instagram users.
2.6.1 Countermeasures
Instagram has a variety of options for reducing or disrupting the impact of an abusive
action, and we experiment with two. Each countermeasure response comes with a trade-off
between its effectiveness at disrupting abuse, and the ease with which an adversary detects the
intervention.
Synchronous Block. When blocking AAS actions, the actions are not successful and do
not reach users of Instagram. Such a countermeasure directly undermines the perceived value of
using an AAS. At the same time, though, the transparent aspect of the synchronous response
serves as an oracle of what actions Instagram can detect as abusive. The AAS can use this oracle
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to easily test and possibly adjust their strategy for delivering their actions to accommodate or
sidestep the countermeasure within a short period of time.
Delayed Removal of Follows. With the delayed removal countermeasure, follows
from accounts used by AASs are initially successful but then are removed by Instagram one day
after taking place. The deferred nature of the delayed response helps mask the countermeasure as
it is more difficult for AASs to realize their actions are being detected. Note that we only apply
this countermeasure to follow actions, as it was not possible to apply a delayed countermeasure
on likes.
2.6.2 Identifying Eligible Actions
As with all anti-abuse measures, from spam filtering to anti-virus, one must balance the
value provided in addressing abusive behavior against the unintentional misclassification of a
benign action. Thus, while AASs are insidious in undermining the confidence in the integrity
of the content being posted, so too must we consider and be sensitive to users whose legitimate
actions might be inadvertently blocked or removed. To this end, we have carefully designed our
interventions to minimize these risks; throughout the duration of our experiments we identified a
handful of false positives and these were remediated manually.
In particular, we start by focusing on actions from the small number of ASNs that the
AASs use. Then we define a per-account daily activity threshold for each ASN, and only actions
above that threshold are candidates for a countermeasure. The threshold is defined in terms
of legitimate activity, so activity by an account above the threshold strongly suggests abusive
behavior by that account. Specifcially, we track the number of outbound actions from Instagram
accounts used by the Reciprocity Abuse AASs, and we track the number of inbound actions from
accounts used by the Collusion Network AAS. We use the same methodology from Section 2.5
combined with paid honeypot accounts to track AAS activity and reactions to countermeasures.
Note that we compute the activity thresholds differently across ASNs since some ASNs
have only AAS traffic while others have benign user activity blended in. For ASNs with both
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AAS and benign traffic, we measure the daily 99th percentile of likes and follows produced
by Instagram accounts that are not participating in AASs. Since accounts involved in AASs
produce significantly more actions than non-AAS accounts, using the daily 99th percentile of
non-AAS activity represents an upper bound of 1% false positives. For ASNs with only AAS
traffic, we use a threshold of the daily 25th percentile of actions since there is no legitimate user
traffic from those ASNs.
We computed the activity level thresholds at the start of each experiment and did not
change them to prevent an adversary from affecting the false positive rate. Throughout both
experiments we actively monitored complaints to Instagram from users who might be affected
by our experiments. We received only a handful of complaints from legitimate users who were
inadvertently impacted which we worked to address. In contrast, we also monitored complaints
to the AASs from their customers, and some of the interventions generated highly voluble
complaints.
2.6.3 Narrow Interventions
In our first intervention we evaluate how AASs react to the countermeasures from
Section 2.6.1 when they are continuously applied for six weeks to the same subsets of AAS
customers. To define different sets of Instagram accounts that may receive a countermeasure
response, we deterministically partition Instagram accounts into 10 equally-sized bins. We assign
separate bins for each countermeasure response (block and delay) and another for a control.
By partitioning Instagram accounts into 10 bins, each bin contains at least 5% of long-term
customers (for each AAS) that produce actions eligible for a countermeasure (Section 2.6.2).
Throughout a six-week period in 2017, we continuously apply each of the two countermeasure
responses to all eligible AAS actions that go above the daily activity threshold when the Instagram
account is within a particular countermeasure bin. Accounts in the control bin never receive a
countermeasure even when actions go beyond the activity threshold. In total, this experiment
applies countermeasures to at most 20% of the customers in each AAS.
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Figure 2.5. Median follows per user each day participating in Boostgram. We show the
countermeasure threshold as a dashed line, and the median actions for both users who are
blocked by countermeasures, and in our control (no countermeasures)
When applying the countermeasures to follow actions, all of the AASs react similarly.
Figure 2.5 shows Boostgram activity as a representative example. Each curve shows the median
number of actions per Instagram account in each countermeasure bin and the control bin for
each day of the six-week period of the experiment. The dashed “Follow Threshold” line shows
the threshold above which the countermeasure affects actions in Instagram. The service reacts
immediately to blocking follows, dropping the number of actions below the threshold and
probing it thereafter. Boostgram (and the other services) clearly detect that blocking is taking
place, and the reaction patterns across services strongly suggests that it is an automated process;
indeed, we found an openly available implementation of one of these services with block
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detection logic. Countermeasures that provide a strong signal to the services unfortunately
enable them to adapt, and adapt quickly.
Even more interesting, though, is that the services do not react to delayed removal of
follows, even though the countermeasure undoes all of the activity one day later. Ironically,
delayed forms of countermeasure satisfy both sides: the services successfully perform follows
and continue on apparently unaware that the countermeasure cleans them up shortly afterwards
as if they never happened. (Customers of the services, though, lose out.) Blocking and delayed
removal both ultimately have the same benefit to Instagram— follow actions are truncated to
the threshold — but blocking provides a signal to services, while delays do not.
Only Hublaagram reacts when we apply the countermeasures to likes, presumably since
likes are its primary source of income. Figure 2.6 shows the proportion of daily likes above
the threshold that the countermeasures can affect. Again, Hublaagram only reacts to blocking
and, because blocking is straightforward to detect, it is able to drop its like activity and discover
the threshold under which blocking does not take place. Hublaagram does take three weeks into
the intervention period to react, perhaps because it had to implement blocked like detection.
2.6.4 Broad Interventions
Our first intervention applied each countermeasure to a narrow 10% of users, perhaps
so narrow that the services did not fully notice or react to countermeasures (delay removal in
particular). Consequently, our second intervention applied the delay and block countermeasures
broadly to 90% of the AAS user accounts, keeping the same 10% bin of control accounts as
before. In this experiment we apply the delayed removal for one week, and then blocking for
another.
The reactions of the AASs to the broad intervention are similar to their reactions for
the narrow intervention. As representative behavior, Figure 2.7 shows the proportion of daily
Boostgram follows above the activity threshold that are subject to countermeasures. The control
bin, with 10% of accounts, appropriately has 10% of the actions above the threshold throughout.
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Figure 2.6. The proportion of Hublaagram likes each day that are eligible for a countermeasure.
We noticed at around the third week the service makes a strict adjustment significantly reducing
the number of eligible likes.
In the first week we deploy the delay countermeasures to the remaining 90% of accounts, again
with no reaction by Boostgram — even though the countermeasure now applies to actions above
the threshold for nearly all of their users. We then replace delay with the block countermeasure
for the second week. As with the narrow intervention, Boostgram detects that their follows are
being blocked and scales back their actions to the threshold.
Epilogue. The broad intervention remained active, continuing to block likes and delay
follows above the activity threshold for additional months. Since the services immediately
detected blocked actions, all AASs eventually moved their like traffic to different ASNs — one
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Figure 2.7. Proportion of Boostgram follows eligible for countermeasures each week during the
experiment. On day 6, we switched the countermeasure response from delay to block, shown by
a vertical line.
of them going so far as to use an extensive proxy network to drastically increase IP diversity.
As a result, the like actions from the AAS were subsequently out of reach of the blocking
countermeasure we employed, underscoring the risks of a countermeasure so easily detected.
After a few months, Hublaagram, unable to produce sustainable unblocked actions,
stopped accepting customer payments by listing all offered services as “out of stock”. Insta*, on
the other hand, eventually moved their follow actions back into the original ASN in which we
applied the delayed intervention.
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2.7 Conclusion
Social networks such as Instagram attract abuse because they provide a mechanism for
attracting and focusing the attention of large groups. Whether for social or economic reasons,
a range of users are interested in artificially inflating their standing in such networks — pay-
ing to acquire thousands of follows, pervasive likes of their photos and so on. Simplistic
approaches to manipulate social standing (i.e., using fake accounts) can be readily detected and
thus sophisticated services have emerged that remotely “drive” the accounts of their customers
to manipulate their social standing in a manner more likely to appear organic. We have identified
two common techniques used to achieve this end on the Instagram network — driving outbound
follows to attract reciprocal follows (reciprocity abuse) and laundering social actions across a
network of customer participants (collusion networks). We’ve shown that services using these
techniques have been successful in attracting and maintaining long-term customers generating
per-service revenues between $200k-900k per month. Finally, we have shown through controlled
experiments that blocking such services, while effective in the short term, quickly drives adapta-
tion and can make it difficult to amortize the cost of developing accurate abuse classification.
Consequently, from the standpoint of protecting non-abusive users from artificial content, a
more effective long-term strategy can be built on deferred interventions (e.g., removing synthetic
actions after at a future point). Such approaches greatly increase the “debug time” for services
seeking to reverse engineer how they are being detected and are less likely to drive the customer
complaints that incentive services to pursue such adaptations.
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Chapter 3
Measuring Security Practices and How
They Impact Security
Thus far, we have presented systems that disrupt well defined types of compromise (i.e.,
malicious extensions, and underground services) from the vantage point of online social networks.
In our final study, we measure the prevalence of security “best practices” and device behaviors
(e.g., the types of web sites visited), along with how they correlate to device compromise.
In particular, we develop a system to empirically evaluate how recommended security “best
practices” and behaviors relate to device compromise by analyzing the passive network traffic
of over 15,000 laptop and desktop devices using a university’s residential network. Unlike the
vantage point of online social networks which is constrained to social network actions, passive
network traffic contains a broader set of device actions (e.g., software updates, social network
activity, etc.). However, this activity is encoded within network traffic, and fine-grained detail
into the context of each action is commonly obscured by encryption. Consequently, network
traffic requires considerable processing to identify device features. To address these challenges,
we develop network traffic signatures that enable the detection of a range of security practices
and behaviors.
We describe the design and implementation of a system that builds per-device feature
models identifying security practices and behaviors. Next, we present a methodology using
quantitative measurement, network traffic signatures, and HTTP User-Agent strings to isolate
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laptop and desktop devices on the network. By combining our per-device feature models
with operational security logs used to identify compromised devices, we develop a data-driven
understanding around features that correlate with security outcomes. Lastly, we describe a
logistic model that ranks the features we detect in terms of their ability to predict security
outcomes relative to one another. Analyzing months of longitudinal data we find that a number
of recommended security “best practices” are followed, however, they do not negatively correlate
with device compromise. Most positively correlated with device compromise is the types of
web site devices visit (e.g., adult content, video games, etc.), and the volume of traffic devices
produce. Subsequently, using an interpretable logistic model we find that behavioral features
such as visiting web sites related to gaming and illegal content are relatively more useful for
distinguishing compromised devices.
3.1 Introduction
Ensuring effective computer security is widely understood to require a combination of
both appropriate technological measures and prudent human behaviors; e.g., rapid installation
of security updates to patch vulnerabilities or the use of password managers to ensure login
credentials are distinct and random. Implicit in this status quo is the recognition that security is
not an intrinsic property of today’s systems, but is a byproduct of making appropriate choices —
choices about what security products to employ, choices about how to manage system software,
and choices about how to engage (or not) with third-party services on the Internet. Indeed, the
codifying of good security choices, commonly referred to as policy or “best practice” has been a
part of our lives as long as security has been a concern.
However, establishing the value provided by these security practices is underexamined at
best. First, we have limited empirical data about which security advice is adopted in practice.
Users have a plethora of advice to choose from, highlighted by Reeder et al’s recent study of
expert security advice, whose title — “152 Simple Steps to Stay Safe Online” — underscores
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the variability in such security lore [78]. Clearly few users are likely to follow all such dicta,
but if user behavior is indeed key to security, it is important to know which practices are widely
followed and which have only limited uptake.
A second, more subtle issue concerns the efficacy of security practices when followed:
Do they work? Here the evidence is scant. Even practices widely agreed upon by Reeder’s
experts (e.g., keep software patched) are not justified beyond a rhetorical argument. In fact,
virtually all the most established security best practices — including “use antivirus software”,
“use HTTPS/TLS”, “update your software regularly”, “use a password manager”, and so on
— have attained this status without empirical evidence quantifying their impact on security
outcomes. Summarizing this state of affairs, Herley writes, “[Security] advice is complex and
growing, but the benefit is largely speculative or moot”, which he argues leads rational users to
reject security advice [36].
To summarize, our existing models of security all rely on end users to follow a range
of best practices. However, we neither understand the extent to which they are following this
advice, nor do we have good information about how much this behavior ultimately impacts their
future security.
This paper seeks to make progress on both issues—the prevalence of popular security
practices and their relationship to security outcomes—via longitudinal empirical measurement of
a large population of computer devices. In particular, we monitor the online behavior of 15,291
independently administered desktop/laptop computers and identify per-device security behaviors,
for instance: what software they are running (e.g., antivirus products, password managers, etc.), is
the software patched, and what is their network usage (e.g., does the machine contact file sharing
sites), as well as as concrete security outcomes (i.e., whether a particular machine becomes
compromised). In the course of this work, we describe three primary contributions:
• Large-scale passive feature collection. Our results are based on passive monitoring which
is what allows large-scale measurement. This has required us to develop and test a large
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dictionary of classification rules to indirectly infer software state on monitored machines
(e.g., that a machine is running antivirus of a particular brand, or if its OS has been
updated). In addition, to ensure that features are consistently associated with particular
devices, we describe techniques for addressing a range of aliasing challenges due to DHCP
and to DNS caching.
• Outcome-based analysis. We use a combination of operational security logs and network
intrusion detection alerts to identify the subset of machines in our data set that are truly
compromised. This allows us to examine the impact of adopted security practices in terms
of individual security outcomes and with respect to concrete time periods surrounding the
likely time of compromise.
• Prevalence and impact of security practices. Using our data we establish the prevalence
of a range of popular security practices as well as how these behaviors relate to security
outcomes. We specifically explore the hypotheses that a range of existing “best practices”
are negatively correlated with host compromise or that “bad practices” are positively
correlated. We consider both behaviors that could directly lead to compromise and those
which may indirectly reflect a user’s attentiveness to security hygiene.
Finally, while we find a number of behaviors that are positively correlated with host
compromise, few “best practices” exhibit the negative correlations that would support their value
in improving end user security.
3.2 Background
This study follows a large body of prior work that empirically relates user activity to
various risk factors, which we highlight in five categories below.
Small scale studies of individuals. In 2008, Carlinet et al. [12] analyzed three hour long
packet traces of ADSL customers (covering between 900 and 200 customers) and correlated
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hosts that experienced at least one Snort IDS alert with other factors. This revealed a relationship
between those machines raising alerts, and their use of the Windows operating system as well as
heavy web browsing habits. Our study is similarly based on passive network data collection, but
we operate at a significantly larger scale (in number and diversity of hosts as well as duration)
and we also explicitly try to control for a range of confounding factors.
Aggregate studies of user behavior.
Others have studied risk factors in aggregate across large organizations. Notably, Yang et
al. [57] correlated publicly declared data breaches and Web site hacks with external measurements
(e.g., misconfigured DNS or HTTPS certificates). They found that evidence of organizational
failures to police security is predictive of attacks. Xiao et al. [98] similarly showed by user
patterns of security activity can be a predictor of future malware outbreaks in an ISP.
Web access behavior. Other researchers have investigated how a user’s web browsing
habits reveal risk factors. Levesque et al. [53] monitored web browser activity for 50 users over
four months and found that the likelihood of visiting a malware hosting site was correlated with
the other kinds of sites a machine visited (e.g., with peer-to-peer (P2P) and gambling sites)
Canali et al. [11] replicated this study using antivirus telemetry (100,000 users), and Sharif et
al. [82] describe a similar analysis for 20,000 mobile users. Both found that frequent, nighttime,
and weekend browsing activity, are correlated with security risk.
Software Updates. Another vein of research has correlated poor software update habits
with indicators of host compromise. Kahn et al. [51] used passive monitoring of roughly 5,000
hosts to infer software updates and used the Bothunter traffic analysis tool [33] to infer likely
infected hosts based on suspicious traffic patterns (e.g., based on outbound scanning). They
found a positive correlation between infection indicators and a lack of regular updating practice.
At a larger scale, Bilge et al. [6] used antivirus logs and host telemetry from over 600,000
enterprise hosts to retrospectively relate software updates to subsequent infections. They found
that devices that do not patch correlate with those that were at some point infected. Finally,
Sarabi et al. [79] used a similar data set of 400,000 Windows hosts and found that patching faster
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provides limited benefit if vulnerabilities are frequently added into product code.
Human factors. Finally, there is an extensive literature on the human factors issues
involved in relating security advice to users, the extent to which the advice leads to changes
in behaviors, and how such effects are driven by both individual self-confidence and cultural
norms [30, 80, 89, 75, 76, 77, 91, 92].
3.3 Methodology
We use passive network traffic monitoring to model security and behavioral practices
among tens of thousands of devices that use a university residential network. Passive network
monitoring has a number of advantages, enabling us to remove potential personally-identifiable
information (PII) from the traffic before it is processed, to scale data collection and analysis to
tens of thousands of hosts, and to implement custom network traffic analysis rules to extract
fine-grained features (e.g., whether an application is being updated to the latest version).
In this section, we describe our system that converts network traffic into per-device
models comprised of features associated with security and behavioral practices. We start by
describing the steps we take to ensure the privacy and security of the network data we process.
We then describe in detail the three stages of our data collection and analysis system, as shown
in Figure 3.1.
3.3.1 Protecting User Privacy
Due to the sensitive nature of processing raw network traces, we have taken a number of
steps to ensure the privacy and security of the data we use in this study.
Institutionally, we had extensive discussions with our campus network operations and
security groups about this study, both about the operational mechanics of mirroring network
traffic from the campus switches and about the security and privacy issues of processing raw
packet data. As one of their motivations for engaging, the campus security group in particular
was interested in the outcome of this research as a way to provide more empirical insight into
66
Network Traffic Processing
Bro
DHCP
Syslog
Log 
AnonL
oa
d 
B
al
an
ce
rs
BroBroBro IDS
Residential
Traffic
DHCP Traffic
D
M
Z
D
M
Z
Logs
Log Decoration
SSL
Labeling
Connection
Labeling
HTTP
Labeling
Feature Extraction (Hadoop) 
Device
Models
HDFS
&
Hive
Fe
at
ur
es
Supplemental Data
Figure 3.1. System architecture overview. Network traffic is first processed into logs and
anonymized. The next stage replays the network traffic logs to extract further information and
label each connection with MAC address information. The decorated logs are then stored in
Hive where they are labeled with security incidents, security practice features, and behavioral
features. Lastly, device models are created for analysis.
security risks and outcomes of devices using the campus network.1 We have also engaged
with our campus institutional review board (IRB), and obtained approval from a campus-wide
cybersecurity governance committee.
Operationally, we anonymize and secure the data we process. The raw network traffic
from which features are extracted is the most sensitive data artifact flowing through our system.
To minimize risks, as soon as each connection has been processed, we discard the raw content
and log only metadata from the connection (e.g., a feature indicating that device X is updating
antivirus product Y ). To anonymize IP and MAC addresses, we use a keyed format-preserving
encryption scheme [5]. We encrypt campus IP addresses and the identifying last 24-bits of each
MAC address (preserving the organizationally unique identifier (OUI) to derive the network
device manufacturer).2 This encryption transform has the property that it is impossible to
obtain the original address without the encryption key. Only our campus network operations
is in possession of the key, and we remain ignorant of the identities of the particular machines
involved. Yet, the resulting data is in the same format as normal IP and MAC addresses and is
consistent over time, so we can use standard trace processing and analysis tools unchanged. The
1Indeed, during the course of our work we have been able to report a variety of unexpected and suspicious
activity to campus for further action.
2Thus, the IP address 192.168.0.1 may be replaced with 205.4.32.501 and the MAC address
00:26:18:a5:38:24 may become 00:26:18:b5:fe:ba.
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anonymization takes place on the server that processes the network traffic, thus only anonymized
logs are ever transmitted to our analysis server (across the “DMZ” in Figure 3.1).
Moreover, we use a combination of physical and network security to restrict access to
the server processing raw network traces. The server is physically located in a secure campus
machine room with restricted access, and the server firewall restricts access to a few on-campus
machines using multi-factor authentication. We also instrument the server with a log monitoring
application [52] that reports daily activity. We use the same network security steps for the other
servers that process only anonymized data, but the servers are physically located in our local
machine room.
3.3.2 Network Traffic Processing
The first stage of our system takes as input 4–6 Gbps of raw bi-directional network traffic
from the campus residential network, and outputs anonymized logs of processed network events
at the rate of millions of records per second. To track the contemporaneous mapping of IP
addresses to device MAC addresses, this stage also collects and anonymizes Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) syslog traffic.
Residential Network Traffic
As shown in the Network Traffic Processing stage of Figure 3.1, our server receives
network traffic mirrored from a campus Arista switch using two 10G fiber optic links. In addition
to load balancing, the switch filters out high-volume traffic from popular Content Delivery
Networks (CDNs) (e.g., Netflix, YouTube, Akamai, etc.) resulting in a load of 4–6 Gbps of
traffic on our server.
To minimize loss while processing traffic, we experimented with a number of network
processing configurations before settling on the following. We use the PF RING ZC (Zero
Copy) framework [68] to move traffic from the network card directly into user-level ring buffers,
bypassing the kernel. We then use the zbalance ipc application from PF RING ZC to locally
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perform 4-tuple load balancing across many virtual network interfaces. Instances of the Bro
(now Zeek) intrusion detection system (IDS) [69] then read from each virtual network interface,
consuming and processing the network traffic into a custom log format. This configuration results
in an average daily loss of 0.5% of received packets throughout our six-month measurement
period.
While IDSs are typically used for detecting threats and anomalous network behavior, we
use Bro to convert network traffic into logs since it is extensible, discards raw network traffic
as soon as a connection is closed (or after a timeout), and is able to parse numerous network
protocols [99]. We also customize the Bro output logs to record only information needed to
identify security practice and behavioral features.
In total, we use the HTTP, SSL, DNS, and Connection protocol analyzers. The HTTP
analyzer provides a summary of HTTP traffic on the network, including components such as the
HOST and URI fields. The SSL analyzer extracts the Server Name Indication (SNI) field out of
TLS connections. SNI is an extension of the TLS protocol enabled by most modern browsers,
and allows a client to indicate which hostname is being contacted at the start of an encrypted
connection. The SNI field is particularly useful for inferring the destination of connections that
otherwise are encrypted. The DNS analyzer provides a summary of Domain Name System (DNS)
requests and responses. Lastly, the Connection analyzer summarizes information about TCP,
UDP, and ICMP connections.
Every thirty minutes Bro rotates the previous logs through our log anonymization tool
(Section 3.3.1) that encrypts campus IP addresses. At this stage of processing, the logs contain IP
addresses and not MAC addresses since DHCP traffic is not propagated to our network vantage
point. After being anonymized, the logs are rotated across the DMZ to another server for further
processing (Section 3.3.3).
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DHCP Traffic
The server also runs a syslog collector that receives forwarded DHCP traffic from the
residential network’s DHCP servers. DHCP dynamically provides an IP address to a device
joining the network. The IP address is leased to the device (by MAC address) for a specified
duration, typically 15 minutes. Since we need to track a device’s security and behavioral practices
for long time periods, we utilize this IP-to-MAC mapping in later processing.
Similar to the Bro IDS logs, every thirty minutes we process the previous DHCP traffic
into a (MAC address, IP address, starting time, lease duration) tuple. Then, the entire IP address
and identifying lower 24-bits of the MAC address are encrypted using our anonymization tool
(Section 3.3.1). The anonymized DHCP logs are then rotated across the DMZ to the Log
Decoration server.
3.3.3 Log Decoration
The second stage takes as input the anonymized network event and DHCP logs, and
processes them further to produce a single stream of network events associated with device MAC
addresses and domain names.
Associating Flows to Devices. Our goal is to model device behavior based upon network
activity over long time spans. While we identify unique devices based upon their MAC address,
the network events that we trace are collected with dynamically assigned IP addresses. As a
result, we must track dynamic IP address assignments so that we can map IP-based network
events to specific device MAC addresses.
We use a Redis key-value store [74] to build a DHCP cache by replaying campus DHCP
logs. We use the DHCP cache to assign a MAC address to the inbound and outbound IP of each
connection. We consider an IP-to-MAC mapping valid if a connection takes place during the
time when the IP address was allocated and the lease is still valid. In the event that there is not a
valid mapping (e.g., the IP address is a non-University IP, or a the device uses a static IP), we do
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not assign a MAC address to the IP.
Associating Flows to Domains. When using network activity to model device behavior,
it useful to know the domain name associated with the end points devices are communicating with
(e.g., categorizing the type of web site being visited). We also extract the registered domain and
top-level domain (TLD) from each fully qualified domain name using the Public Suffix List [64].
Again, since the network events we observe use IP addresses, we must map IP addresses to
domain names. And since the mapping of DNS names to IP addresses also changes over time, we
also dynamically track DNS resolutions as observed in the network so that we can map network
events to the domain names involved.
Due to our network vantage point, the DNS traffic our collection server observes generally
has the source IP address of our local DNS resolver, and not the IP address of the host which
will subsequently make a connection to the resolved IP.3 Therefore, one of the steps in this
stage is to build a local DNS cache by replaying the logs in chronological order and labeling the
domain name of observed connections where it is not already provided (i.e., excluding HTTP
and SNI-labeled connections).
We use another Redis key-value store to build a DNS cache by replaying DNS traffic.
The cache tracks the mappings of each IP address to domain name at the time the IP address was
observed. We consider a mapping to be valid as long as it has not expired — the log time falls
between the time at which the DNS request was observed plus the response time to live (TTL) —
and there is one registered domain name mapped to the IP address.
When sites use virtual hosting, it is possible that an IP address has multiple domain
names associated with it. In this case, we first check if the registered domain names match (e.g.,
bar.bar.com and car.bar.com share a registered domain of bar.com). If the registered domains
match, we label the connection using the longest suffix substring match (e.g., ar.bar.com) and
set a flag indicating that the fully qualified domain name has been truncated. In the case where
there is more than one registered domain with a valid mapping to the IP address, we do not use
3The primary exceptions are devices configured to use remote DNS resolvers.
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the mapping to label connections until enough of the conflicting mappings expire such that they
share a registered domain, or there is only one mapping.
User Agent. We parse HTTP user agent strings using the open-source ua-parser library.
From the user agent string we extract browser, OS, and device information when present.
3.3.4 Feature Extraction
In the final stage of our system we store the log events in a Hive database [2] and process
them to extract a wide variety of software and network activity features associated with the
devices and their activity as seen on our network. The last critical feature is device outcomes:
knowing when a device has become compromised. We derive device outcomes from a log of
alerts from a campus IDS appliance, and also store that information in our database.
Software Features
To identify features describing application use on devices, we crafted custom network
traffic signatures to identify application use (e.g., a particular peer-to-peer client) as well as
various kinds of application behavior (e.g., a software update). To create our network signatures
we use virtual machines instrumented with Wireshark [97]. We then manually exercise various
applications and monitor the machine’s network behavior for a unique signature. Fortunately
most applications associated with security risk frequently reveal their presence when checking
for updates. In total, we develop network signatures for 69 different applications, including
OSs. For a subset of applications, we are also able to detect the application’s version. Knowing
application versions allows us to compare how fine-grained recommended security practices (i.e.,
updating regularly) correlates with device compromise.
Antivirus Software. Using antivirus software is virtually always recommended. We
created network signatures for 12 popular antivirus products, seven of which are recognized as
offering the “Best Protection” for 2019 [65].
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Antivirus Software
1. Avast
2. AVG
3. Avira
4. BitDefender
5. ESET
6. Kaspersky
7. McAfee
8. Microsoft Security Essentials
9. Microsoft Windows Defender
10. Norton
11. Sophos
12. Webroot
Operating System. We created six signatures to identify the OSs running on devices.
Since regular OS updating is a popular recommended security practice, we also created signatures
to detect OS updates. While Windows and Mac OS operating system updates are downloaded
over a CDN that is removed from the network traffic before reaching our system (Section 3.3.2),
we can use OS version information from the host header and User-Agent string provided in
HTTP traffic to infer that updates have taken place.
Operating Systems
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1. CentOS
2. Debian
3. Mac OS
4. Red Hat
5. Ubuntu
6. Windows
Applications. Through a combination of network and User-Agent string signatures we
detect 41 applications, including those commonly perceived as risky such as Adobe Flash Player,
Adobe Reader, Java, Tor, P2P applications, and more. We also detect other popular applications,
including browsers, Spotify, iTunes, Outlook, Adobe AIR, and more.
Applications
1. Adobe AIR
2. Adobe Flash Player
3. Adobe Reader
4. Airmail
5. Android Browser
6. Apple Mail
7. Chrome Browser (desktop and mobile)
8. Chromium Browser
9. Dominant Web Browser (from User-Agent strings)
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10. Edge Browser (desktop and mobile)
11. Firefox Browser (desktop and mobile)
12. Internet Explorer (IE) Browser(desktop and mobile)
13. Internet Rely Chat
14. Jabber/Google Chat
15. Java
16. MSN Chat
17. Netscape Browser
18. Nokia Browser Browser
19. Opera Browser (desktop and mobile)
20. Outlook
21. P2P Ares
22. P2P Azureus
23. P2P BTwebclient
24. P2P BitTorrent
25. P2P Kazaa
26. P2P Kugoo
27. P2P Soulseek
28. P2P Thundernetwork
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29. P2P Vuze
30. P2P ed2k
31. P2P edonkey
32. P2P emule
33. P2P libTorrent
34. P2P uTorrent
35. Safari Browser (desktop and mobile)
36. Samsung Internet Browser
37. Skype
38. Spotify
39. Thunderbird
40. Tor
41. iTunes
Password Managers. As password managers are frequently recommended to minimize
collateral damage of leaked passwords, we also crafted network signatures for nine popular
password managers [14].
Password Managers
1. 1Password
2. Dashlane
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3. Keeper
4. LastPass
5. LogMeOnce
6. Password Boss
7. RoboForm
8. Sticky Password
9. Zoho Vault
Network Activity
We track a wide variety of features on network activity to quantitatively measure how
much of a protocol is used (e.g., HTTP, and HTTPS), the types of content being accessed (e.g.,
Adult content, etc.), and when devices are most active. In doing so, we implement a set of
features similar to those implemented by Canali et al. [11] and Sharif et al. [82] that focused
on web browsing activity. As our data set also includes traffic beyond HTTP, we can measure
additional behaviors (e.g., remote DNS resolver usage, HTTPS traffic usage, etc.).
Content Categorization. We use the IAB Tech Lab Content Taxonomy to categorize
every registered domain in our data set [40]. The domain categorization was generously provided
by WebShrinker [95, 22]. The IAB taxonomy includes 404 distinct domain categories [94]. We
use the domain categorization to measure the fraction of unique domains each device accesses in
a specific category. We also built a list of file hosting sites, and URL shortening services that we
use to identify when a device accesses these types of services.
Usage Patterns. We also develop a number of behavioral features that describe the
quantities of HTTP and HTTPS traffic in each TLDs, and the number of network requests made.
Additionally, we develop features that quantify customized or non-standard behaviors such the
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use of remote DNS resolvers, and the proportions of HTTP requests made directly to IP addresses
(instead of a domain name).
Network Features
1. Percentage distinct registered domains in IAB categories
2. Total distinct HTTP TLDs
3. Total distinct HTTP registered domains
4. Total distinct HTTP FQNDs
5. Total HTTP URLs
6. Total distinct HTTP URLs
7. Total distinct HTTP URLs with host as IP address
8. Fraction of HTTP connections: in TLDs
9. Fraction of HTTP connections: day of the week
10. Fraction of HTTP connections: hour of day
11. Fraction of HTTP connections: hour of day of week
12. Total distinct HTTPS TLDs
13. Total distinct HTTPS registered domains
14. Total distinct HTTPS FQDNs
15. Fraction of distinct HTTP registered domains in TLDs
16. Fraction of distinct HTTP registered domains in TLDs: com net org
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17. Fraction of distinct HTTP registered domains not in TLDs: com net org
18. Fraction of distinct HTTPS connections in each TLD
19. Fraction of distinct HTTPS connections in TLDs: com net org
20. Fraction of distinct HTTPS connections not in TLDs: com net org
21. Total distinct HTTP and HTTPS TLDs
22. Total distinct HTTP and HTTPS registered domains
23. Total distinct HTTP and HTTPS FQDNs
24. Organizational Unique Identifier (OUI) vendor
25. Percent TCP connections to local IP
26. Percent TCP connections to remote IPs
27. Percent UDP connections to local IP
28. Percent UDP connections to remote IP
29. Unique /24 networks visited
30. Unique /24 networks visited using TCP
31. Unique /24 networks visited using UDP
32. Uses a remote DNS resolver
33. Number of remote DNS resolvers
34. URL shorteners
35. Email providers
36. File hosting sites
79
Detecting Security Incidents
While previous work has relied on the use of blacklists or Google Safe Browsing to
identify devices that expose users to potential risk, we are able to identify compromised devices
with high-confidence as a result of post-infection behavior typically in the form of command
and control (CNC) communication. To identify compromised devices (i.e., ones with a security
incident) we use alerts generated by a campus network appliance running the Suricata IDS [85].
The campus security system uses deep packet inspection with an industry-standard malware rule
set to flag devices exhibiting post-compromise behavior [72].
The IDS rules also detect network activity that might occur before a device becomes
compromised (e.g., possible phishing attempts, exploit kit landing pages, etc.). Since we focus
on compromised devices, we reduce the rules we consider to ones that explicitly detect post-
infection behavior. We then manually remove rules that are frequently triggered, but do not
indicate that a device has been compromised.
3.4 Data Set
We analyze six months of data from our passive network traffic processing system from
June 2018 to December 2018. In this section we describe our approach for identifying the laptop
and desktop devices for use in analyzing security risk factors, and determining the dominant OS
of devices used in our analysis. In the end, our data set consists of 15,291 devices. In Table 3.1,
we characterize our data set in terms of connections processed, and inbound and outbound bytes.
3.4.1 Device Filtering
The university allows heterogeneous devices on its network, including personal comput-
ers, mobile phones, printers, IoT devices, and more. Recommended security practices, however,
are commonly offered for laptop and desktop computers, and we focus our analysis solely on
such devices. As a result, we develop techniques to identify laptop and desktop computers among
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Table 3.1. Data set characterization. Our network vantage point provides DNS request from the
local resolver which includes DNS traffic from devices in this paper as well as other devices
using the university’s networks.
Name Value
Date Range June 2018 – December 2018
Total Filtered Devices 15,291
DNS Connections 17.1 B
Non-DNS Connections 1.92 B
Total Connections 19 B
Outbound Bytes 38.4 TB
Inbound Bytes 720 TB
Total Bytes 758 TB
the many other devices on the network. We remove devices that are easily identifiable, and then
develop heuristics to filter remaining devices.
We first remove devices that are not active for a minimum of 14 days, and ones that
never provide a major web browser’s User-Agent string (removing 13.1% of all devices). For
studying security practices, devices need to have a modicum degree of network activity to be
able to model behavior, and devices without any web browser activity are a strong indication that
they are not laptops or desktops.
Next, we use User-Agent strings to identify a device’s OS [32]. Since applications are
not required to provide accurate User-Agent string information, to identify a device’s OS we
consider User-Agent strings from major browsers, and require that a device’s OS is consistent on
95% of all requests. We filter 40.8% of the total devices that we identify as having mobile or IoT
OS. For the fraction of devices that fall below the 95% requirement, we remove ones that contact
domains which are not regularly accessed by laptop or desktop devices4 (4.1% of all devices).
We also compile a list of network hardware vendors used within devices other than
laptops and desktops (e.g., Vizio, etc.), and remove devices with a matching OUI vendor (2.2%
of devices).
4We manually label domains that are contacted by TVs, printers, game consoles, and iPhones. We also exclude
devices that never make a single connection to any university web site.
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Lastly, we filter some of the remaining IoT devices using network traffic-based heuristics.
Our intuition is that most of these devices5 will either make close to the same number of
connections each day, a small number of daily connections, or connections within a limited
number of /24 network subnets. We pick each threshold by manually inspecting the three network
traffic distributions, and select the value corresponding to the first peak of the distribution. We
remove devices that make the same number of connections each day ±7, on-average 40 daily
connections, or contact on-median 31 distinct /24 networks each week (4.2% of all devices).
To validate our device filtering heuristics in practice, we manually label a sample of 100
devices (50 laptop and desktop, and 50 that are removed). We find our filtering methodology to be
sufficiently accurate: one laptop is incorrectly removed, and four mobile phones are incorrectly
included.
3.4.2 Identifying Dominant OSes
Since different OSs have different risk profiles, identifying the OS used by a device is
an important step. Being able to observe device network traffic makes OS identification an
interesting task. The majority of devices are straightforward: using signatures of OS update
events, we can immediately identify a single unambiguous OS for 79.1% of devices.
The remaining devices either have no OS update signatures, or have more than one.6
For these devices, we use a combination of OS update signatures, OS User-Agent strings, and
OUI vendor name information to identify the dominant OS of a device (e.g., the host OS with
virtual machines, Windows if tethering an iPhone, etc.). We assume that devices with an Apple
OUI vendor name will be using Mac OS (7.2%). We then use the dominant OS extracted from
User-Agent strings to assign an OS (11.5%). The remaining 340 devices (2.1%) have both
Windows and Mac OS updates. We choose to assign Windows as the dominant OS in these cases
because of strong evidence of tethering, in which iTunes allows users to update their other Apple
5With the exception of user-directed IoT devices (e.g., Chromecasts, etc.)
6There are a number of legitimate reasons why a device can have more than one OS detected, including
dual-booting between different OSes, using virtual machines, device tethering, etc.
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      Total
Incidents
Operating System Incidents Total Devices
Windows 538 (7.0%) 7,668
Mac OS 140 (1.9%) 7,339
ChromeOS 1 (0.5%) 205
Linux Variant 3 (3.8%) 79
Figure 3.2. Device OS classification after removing IoT and mobile devices, including the total
number of devices with each OS and the number with a security incident.
devices (e.g.iPhone, iPad, etc.) using the network connection of their computer [3].7 For each of
these heuristics, we confirmed the labeling by manually checking the traffic profile of a random
sample of devices.
3.5 Recommended Practices
There are a variety of security practices widely recommended by experts to help users
become safer online. Prior work has explored some of these practices in terms of users being
exposed to risky Web sites. Since our data includes actual security outcomes, we start our
evaluation by exploring the correlation of various security practices to actual device compromises
in our user population: operating system choice, keeping software up to date, Web sites visited,
using HTTPS, and using antivirus software.
3.5.1 Operating System
Different operating systems have different security reputations, and as a result it is not
surprising that experts have recommendations of the form “Use an uncommon OS” [78]. Part of
the underlying reasoning is that attackers will spend their efforts targeting the devices with most
7We measure the baseline of iTunes installs across devices with only Windows to be 11.9%, whereas the install
rate for these 340 devices is 67%.
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common systems, so using an uncommon operating system makes that device less of a target.
In terms of device compromise, as with previous work and experience, such advice holds
for our user population as well. Using the OS classification method described in Section 3.4.2,
Table 3.2 shows the number of devices using major operating systems and the number of each
that were compromised during our measurement period. Most devices use Windows and Mac
OS, split nearly equally between the two. The baseline compromise rate among devices is 4.5%,
but Windows devices are 3.9 times more likely to be compromised than Mac OS devices. The
Chrome OS population is small, but only one such device was compromised.
Of course, modulo dual-booting or using virtual machines, this kind of advice is only
actionable to users when they are choosing which device to use, and is no help once a user is
already using a system.
3.5.2 Update Software
Among hundreds of security experts surveyed, by far the most popular advice is to “Keep
systems and software up to date” [78]. In this part we explore the operating system, browser, and
Flash update characteristics of the devices in our population, and how they correlate with device
compromise.
Operating System
Mac OS. We start by analyzing the update behavior of devices running Mac OS. Our
system labels each HTTP connection of a device with the type of operating system and its current
version number, both extracted from the User Agent string. However, if a device leaves the
network and returns with an updated version number in the UA string, then we cannot accurately
tell when the device was updated. Thus, we only utilize devices that are absent for less than four
days to bound the error on update times.
We see 7,268 (47.5%) devices that identify as Mac according to the User Agent string.
Of these devices, we see at least one update for 2,113 (29.1% of all Mac OS devices). Figure 3.3
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Figure 3.3. Number of days a Mac OS X device takes to update to a specific version. The
version number on the x-axis denotes the day that the specified version update was published.
Table 3.2. Windows device updates deltas. We compute the average, median, P90, P95, P99,
and variance of the number of days between when the update was released, and when we observe
each device download the update. The devices are partitioned by those with and without a
security incident.
Incident? # Devices µ Median P90 P95 P99 σ2
No 5,976 2.5 0 6 15 42 59
Yes 483 2.6 0 6 14 49 62
shows the update pattern of Mac OS devices over time, anchored around the three OS updates
released by Apple during our measurement period. In general, Mac OS users are relatively slow
to update, anecdotally because of the interruptions and risks Mac OS updates entail.
Of these devices, 57 (2.7%) of them were compromised. Compromised devices have a
mean and median update rate of 16.21 and 14 days, respectively, while their clean counterparts
have a mean and median update rate of 17.96 and 16 days. However, this difference is not
statistically significant according to the Mann-Whitney U test (p= 0.13).
Windows. For Windows we developed a signature to extract the knowledge base (KB)
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number of “Other Software” updates (e.g., Adobe Flash Player, etc.).8 Our signature detects
when a device downloads the update. While we cannot verify that the update was applied, it
does indicate whether the device is using the default Windows Update settings. Since it is
possible to miss an update (e.g., a device may download the update while connected to a different
network), we only compare devices that we see updating. We also restrict the updates considered
to ones released during our measurement period since there is nothing preventing an unpatched
device from joining the network.9 We identify the update’s release day using Microsoft’s Update
Catalog service [62].
Across devices running Windows, we see at least one update for 6,459 of them (84% of
all Windows devices). Table 3.2 shows the average, median, P90, P95, P99, and variance of the
number of days between when an update is downloaded and when it is released. Based upon
the averages and medians, devices update with similar deltas (2.5 days and 0 days, respectively)
regardless of whether they have a security incident. We confirm our hypothesis using the Mann-
Whitney U test (p= 0.052). We also find the fraction of compromised devices that update (7.5%)
to be similar in magnitude to the baseline fraction of incidents across all Windows devices (7.0%).
In short, the update behavior of compromised Windows devices is little different than that of
clean devices.
Web Browser
Updating the browser may be as important as updating the operating system. Browsers
are also large, complex pieces of software used on a daily basis and, as with most software,
these large programs have vulnerabilities. Updating is viewed as such an important process that
Chrome and Firefox employ auto-updating by default [87, 28], with UI features to encourage
timely updating.
As such, we explore the relationship between compromised and clean devices and browser
updating behaviors. Similar to the Mac OS devices, we are able to detect the current browser
8An example update is https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4462930
9We exclude updates released multiple times with the same KB number.
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Table 3.3. Number of days between when an update is published and when devices update.
Compromised devices update faster than their clean counterparts.
Browser Mean, Median, # (Cmp) Mean, Median, # (Cln)
Chrome 14.4, 15.0 (421) 15.4, 15.0 (7883)
Firefox 5.64, 3.00 (24) 9.65, 5.00 (424)
version number from the User Agent string of a device. Since browser vendors publish the dates
when they make updates available,10 we can check whether the browser on a device is out of date
each time we see the device on the network. Across the measurement period, we then calculate
how quickly devices update. Also similarly to the Mac OS analysis, we exclude devices that are
absent from the network for more than three days.
Moreover, we only analyze the dominant browser for each device. Many devices have
User Agent strings naming different browsers. While users may use different browsers for
different use cases, we identify a dominant browser to remove the noise from user applications
that spoof a browser in their User Agent string. Thus, we determine which browser connects to
the largest number of distinct registered domains from a device and label the device with that
dominant browser. We choose unique registered domains as our metric over number of HTTP
connections because there are web sites and applications that “spam” the network, making the
device appear to use one browser dominantly when the natural user behavior is actually coming
from a different browser.
We analyzed updates for devices that dominantly use Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and Safari.
Of the total devices, 10,831 (70.8%) devices use Chrome, 719 (4.7%) devices use Edge, 561
(3.7%) devices use Firefox, and 2993 (19.6%) devices use Safari. However, only 8,304 (76.7%)
of the Chrome devices, 132 (18.4%) of the Edge devices, 448 (80.0%) of the Firefox devices,
and 1592 (53.2%) of the Safari devices are on the network continuously (absent for less than
three days). Table 3.3 shows the browsers with statistically significant differences in update
time between clean and compromised devices (Mann Whitney U: Chrome p= 4.2×10−4 and
10During our measurement period each popular browser had at least three major updates.
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Figure 3.4. Distribution of days a device takes to update Chrome before compromise and after
compromise.
Firefox p= 0.03).
Clean devices appear to spend more time out of date than their compromised counterparts.
Examining this phenomenon in more detail, we examine the update behavior of compromised
devices before and after their compromise date. We focus on devices using Chrome that have two
updates spanning the compromise event (other browsers do not have a sufficiently large sample
size). Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of times devices were out of date with respect to when a
browser update was released for updates before and after the device was compromised. The shift
in distributions illustrates that devices update faster after compromise. In more detail, devices
that use Chrome have a before-compromise mean update rate of 18.9 days (18.0 median days)
and an after-compromise mean update rate of 14.2 days (15.0 days median). This difference is
significant, with p= 4.8×10−12 using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
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Table 3.4. Flash Player updates on Windows devices.
Incident? # Devices µ Median P90 P95 P99 σ2
No 1,702 4.2 1 16 20 30 53
Yes 149 3.7 1 16 21 26 47
Flash Player
The Adobe Flash player has long been associated with security risk and device compro-
mise. The typical recommendation is to not use Flash at all, but if you do, to keep it up to date.
We created a signature to detect Adobe Flash Player on Windows devices.11 We focus on the
desktop version of Flash as major browser vendors issue Flash plugin updates directly. Adobe
released six updates within our measurement period, and we use Adobe’s web site to identify the
version and release date for each update.
Somewhat surprisingly, desktop Flash is still quite prevalent on devices. Fortunately,
though, update patterns and compromise rates do not indicate that the use of Flash puts devices
at greater risk of compromise. A total of 2,167 devices (28% of Windows devices) check for
a Flash Player update, of which 1,851 are seen downloading an update. Table 3.4 shows the
average, median, P90, P95, P99, and variance of the number of days between when an update
is downloaded and when it is released. Curiously, compromised devices updated Flash slightly
faster than clean devices (Mann-Whitney U test p= 0.025). However, the rate of compromise
across devices that update Flash is 8.1%, only slightly higher than the rate across of Windows
devices (7.9%) (Chi-Square p = 0.057). Among the 316 devices that we detect Flash Player
on, but do not see updates, only 15 are compromised (4.8%). We interpret these results as a
community success story. A combination of widespread awareness, aggressive updates, and
focused attention have mitigated it as a significant risk factor.
We next explore why compromised devices update Flash Player more quickly. We
hypothesize that a compromised device’s update behavior will change after being compromised.
11Flash Player updates on Mac OS are downloaded over HTTPS, preventing us from crafting an effective
signature.
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To evaluate this claim, we compare the update patterns for compromised devices before and after
becoming compromised. Out of the 149 compromised devices that update Flash, there are 60
devices (40.3%) with updates before and after their first incident. The median and average days
compromised devices take to update before an incident are 6.5 and 9.9 respectively, and 0 and 1
days after becoming compromised (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p= 1.73×10−7). These results
suggest that shortly after a security incident devices exhibit better Flash update hygiene.
3.5.3 Visit Reputable Web Sites
Experts recommend users to be careful in the web sites that they visit (“Visit reputable
web sites” [78]), and indeed prior work has found that the category of web site users visit can be
indicative of exposure to risky sites [11, 82]. We perform a similar analysis for devices that are
actually compromised, and for the most part confirm that the types of sites that lead to exposure
to risky sites also correlate with actual compromise.
To categorize the content devices access we use the IAB domain taxonomy (Section 3.3.4).
We use the KS test with Bonferroni correction to compare the ECDFs of the fraction of distinct
registered domains in each category that clean and compromised devices access, and confirm
that they are statistically significant (i.e., p< 0.001).
Table 3.5 shows the most substantial differences between the types of content accessed,
e.g., with clean devices accessing more business, advertising, and marketing content, while
compromised devices accessed more gaming, hobby, uncategorized, and illegal. We note that,
while previous work found that exposed devices visit more advertising domains [82], our finding
of the opposite behavior can be explained by differences in methodology. The previous finding
used solely HTTP requests generated by static content, while our network traces include all
HTTP requests (including those generated by JavaScript) as well as HTTPS traffic.
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Table 3.5. Types of content accessed more by clean or compromised devices. We show the
median fraction of registered domains accessed in the category for clean (Cln.) and compromised
(Cmp.) devices, and delta in median.
Clean Devices Access More
Feature Cln. Median Cmp. Median Delta
Business 22.36 20.14 2.22
Advertising 22.65 20.88 1.77
Marketing 12.96 11.66 1.3
Education 3.98 3.53 0.45
Content Server 6.96 6.58 0.38
Television & Video 2.18 1.89 0.29
Arts & Entertainment 2.54 2.27 0.27
Business Software 2.69 2.49 0.2
Web Design/HTML 1.39 1.24 0.15
Compromised Devices Access More
Feature Cln. Median Cmp. Median Delta
Computer Games 1.3 2.84 -1.54
Hobbies & Interests 2.61 3.78 -1.17
Uncategorized 26.25 26.97 -0.72
Technology 17.65 18.08 -0.43
Under Construction 5.33 5.65 -0.32
Network Security 1.43 1.65 -0.22
File Sharing 2.28 2.51 -0.23
News/Weather 2.44 2.64 -0.2
Illegal Content 0.15 0.33 -0.18
Cell Phones 0.0 0.17 -0.17
Comic Books 0.11 0.27 -0.16
Adult Content 0.36 0.51 -0.15
3.5.4 Use HTTPS
Another recommended browsing behavior is to use HTTPS when available. Of course, it
is the web site itself that ultimately determines whether HTTPS can be used: if a site does not
support it, users have to use HTTP. However, since prior studies on device security behavior
were not able to trace HTTPS traffic, we next examine HTTPS use and network activity more
generally, and then examine how it correlates with device compromise.
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For each device, we count the total number of distinct fully qualified domains it contacted
using HTTPS and HTTP (approximating distinct sites visited). We then consider the number of
distinct FQDNs contacted just using HTTPS divided by the total (HTTPS + HTTP) as the ratio
of its HTTPS use. Since a recent study of HTTPS adoption on Chrome and Firefox showed that
it depends on both browser and operating system [26], we similarly categorize first by dominant
browser on the device (Section 3.5.2) and then OS. Table 3.6 shows the mean and median HTTPS
use across all devices, browsers, and operating systems. As a point of comparison, HTTPS use
among the devices in our population is roughly consistent with the results from [26]: devices
contact sites via HTTPS 78% of the time on average, and HTTPS use is lower on Windows (74–
76%) compared to Mac OS (79–80%). In terms of browsers, though, in our device population
Chrome does not have a distinctly higher use of HTTPS for our metric.
Table 3.6. HTTPS use among devices.
Browser OS Mean (Median)
Chrome Mac OS 78.6% (79.2%)
Linux 78.5% (79.0%)
ChromeOS 78.1% (78.3%)
Windows 76.2% (76.2%)
Firefox Linux 80.8% (80.3%)
Mac OS 80.5% (80.7%)
Windows 78.2% (79.0%)
Safari Mac OS 80.5% (80.7&)
Edge Windows 73.6% (74.0%)
All Devices 77.6% (78.5%)
Turning to security outcomes, we separate the activity of devices between HTTP and
HTTPS traffic and calculate their distributions for compromised and clean devices at various
aggregations: number of connections to all and unique URLs (for HTTP), unique fully-qualified
domain names (FQDNs), unique registered domains (RDs), and unique top-level domains
(TLDs), unique /24 “subnets” (also separated into TCP and UDP traffic). To identify significant
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Table 3.7. Differences in network usage for clean (Cln.) and compromised (Cmp.) devices. We
use the KS test with Bonferroni correction to compare the ECDF of usage for each device type,
and present the p-value along with median values for each population.
Feature P-value Cln. Median Cmp. Median
Unique HTTP FQDNs < 0.001 705 1137
Unique HTTP RDs < 0.001 375 522
Unique HTTP TLDs < 0.001 27 36
Unique HTTP IP URLs < 0.001 4 57
Unique HTTPS FQDNs < 0.001 2.5k 3.1k
Unique HTTPS RDs < 0.001 1k 1.2k
Unique HTTPS TLDs 0.001 49.0 57.0
Unique /24 Nets. < 0.001 3.8k 5.3k
Unique TCP /24 Nets. < 0.001 3.6k 4.4k
Unique UDP /24 Nets. < 0.001 20 300
differences in device behavior we use the KS test of statistical significance with Bonferroni
correction. For each aggregation, Table 3.7 shows the p-value and the median values of the
distributions for clean and compromised devices.
Overall, the ratio of HTTPS use is not strongly correlated with security outcomes.The
connections made by compromised have similar usage of HTTPS and HTTP compared to clean
devices that make similar number of connections. However, these results do show that devices
that make more connections use HTTPS more than HTTP.
Across the board both kinds of devices generate more HTTPS traffic than HTTP, but that
the prominent trend is simply that compromised devices generate more web traffic than clean
devices. To illustrate this point in more detail, Figure 3.5 shows the distributions of average
weekly device web activity for clean and compromised devices. For every device, we count
the number of fully qualified domains the device visits via HTTP and HTTPS combined per
week, and normalize by averaging across all weeks that the device was active. Each bar in the
histogram counts the number of devices that visit a given number of FQDNs per week, with
100-domain bins. The distribution for compromised devices is clearly shifted towards visiting
more sites per week (and other traffic granularities show similar behavior). We interpret this
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Figure 3.5. Distributions of average weekly device web activity for clean and compromised
devices.
result as just reflecting that more activity correlates to higher exposure and risk (much like
automobile accidents).
3.5.5 Use Antivirus
Using antivirus software is a nearly universal recommendation. In fact, residential
students on our campus are nominally required to have antivirus software installed on their
devices to use the network. We crafted signatures to detect network activity (e.g., updates to
software or the signature database, callbacks when scanning, etc.) for over a dozen antivirus
products, and Table 3.6 shows the distribution of popular products among our device population.
If a device matched multiple signatures (e.g., Windows Defender and a third-party product), we
counted the device in each category (hence the devices in the table sum to more than the unique
device count). Avast, Windows Defender, and Avira are free, explaining their popularity among
student devices.
Notably, while student devices technically need to have AV installed, regulations are not
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AV Name # Devices %
Avast 6,704 33.2%
Windows 5,752 28.5%
McAfee 3,659 18.1%
Avira 1,837 9.1%
Norton 866 4.3%
Other 1,383 6.8%
Figure 3.6. Five most prevalent antivirus products observed, with all others aggregated as
“Other”.
always followed. We verified that students can still access the residential network with antivirus
installed by repeatedly using a mechanism for visitors, or lying about their device type (e.g.,
claiming a MacBook is an iPad), and 7.5% of our devices fall into this category.
Using AV is strongly recommended to reduce risk. When focusing on Windows devices,
interestingly a larger percentage (7%) of devices with antivirus are compromised compared
to devices that do not have it (4%). By definition, though, most compromised devices in our
population are those that were compromised by malware that antivirus did not catch.
3.5.6 Software Use
As discussed in Section 3.3.4, we extract a wide variety of features about the software
used on devices observed on the network. We now explore how these software features correlate
with a device being compromised. Since compromise depends on the operating system used
(Windows devices are compromised more often than Mac OS devices), we also explore software
features not only in the context of all devices but also individual operating systems.
For each correlated software feature, Table 3.8 shows the device population, fraction
of compromised devices with the feature, and fraction of compromised devices without the
feature. These results provide direct comparisons on compromise rates between devices with a
particular software feature and without: e.g., devices using Tor are compromised 2–3.5× more
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Table 3.8. Software features across device populations correlated with compromise. For each
feature we show the number of devices with the feature, p-value from the Chi-Square test,
fraction of compromised devices with and without the feature. Compromise rates: All devices
4.5%, Windows devices 7%, and Mac OS devices 1.9%.
Group Feature # Dev P-value w/ Feat. w/o Feat.
All Adobe AIR 826 < 0.001 10% 4%
All P2P 2,237 < 0.001 13% 3%
All Thunderbird 69 < 0.001 33% 4%
All Uses Tor 321 < 0.001 12% 4%
All Password Mgr. 434 < 0.001 8% 4%
All Remote DNS 8,631 < 0.001 6% 2%
Win Adobe AIR 490 < 0.001 13% 7%
Win P2P 1,676 < 0.001 15% 5%
Win Thunderbird 28 < 0.001 43% 7%
Win Uses Tor 188 < 0.001 15% 7%
Win Password Mgr. 262 0.001 12% 7%
Win Remote DNS 5,249 < 0.001 8% 5%
Mac Adobe AIR 336 < 0.001 6% 2%
Mac P2P 541 < 0.001 7% 2%
Mac Thunderbird 29 < 0.001 34% 2%
Mac Uses Tor 123 < 0.001 7% 2%
Mac Password Mgr 159 0.755 1% 2%
Mac Remote DNS 3,212 < 0.001 3% 1%
often than devices that do not. To ensure that the comparisons are statistically significant, we use
the Chi-Square test with Bonferroni correction since these are binary categorical features, and
the very low p-values shown in Table 3.8 confirm significance.
Devices using some specific applications correlate very strongly with compromise,
independent of operating system and network activity. Devices using Adobe AIR, P2P file
sharing networks, Thunderbird, and Tor on average are much more likely to be compromised
than devices that do not use such applications. Using these applications does indeed put devices
at significantly more risk. The Thunderbird email client is particularly ironic since one reason
why people use Thunderbird is because of its PGP integration [24]; yet, Thunderbird is rife with
reported vulnerabilities (420 code execution vulnerabilities reported in CVE Details [17]).
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Some of these software features do not directly lead to compromise, but instead indirectly
reflect how attentive users are with respect to security. For instance, devices are not compromised
due to using password managers or not, or whether they are kept updated, but the use of password
managers does suggest that users are more security aware. We find the use of password managers
to be correlated with compromise among the All and Windows device groupings. Similarly, users
who explicitly configure their device to use a remote DNS server, instead of the DHCP default,
reflect a certain degree of sophistication and confidence — for better or worse, considering that
devices using remote DNS servers for resolution have a 1.6–3× higher rate of compromise.
3.6 Ranking Feature Importance
Our analyses so far have focused on individual security practices. As a final step, we
explore the relative importance of all the features we extract using statistical modeling, as well
as the relative importance of features exhibited during the hour before a device is compromised.
Our goal is not to train a general security incident classifier. Rather, it is to generate a logistic
model that produces interpretable results for ranking the relative importance of our features.
3.6.1 Experimental Setup
Logistic regression is a statistical technique for predicting a binary response variable
using explanatory variables [38]. We set the response variable to be whether or not a device is
compromised, and use all of the device features we extract from the network as the explanatory
variables. We first split the data into training (50%) and test (50%), and normalize the explanatory
variables to have zero mean and unit variance.
To find the important explanatory variables we use a specialized type of logistic regression
called least absolute shrinkage and selection operataor (LASSO), or L1 logistic regression, since
we have a high number of explanatory variables. L1 logistic regression can be regularized to
correct for overfitting, thereby preventing a model from becoming too closely tied to the data
that it is built from. Regularization restricts the number of explanatory variables the model
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will use proportionally to how regularized the model is. The regularization parameter itself is
configurable in the Scikit-learn machine learning framework we use [70].
To find the optimal regularization parameter we implement hyperparameter tuning: we
build 200 models, each with a different regularization parameter, and identify the model that
performs best. To identify the best model while avoiding selection bias, for each model, we
perform 10-fold cross validation. We track the average area under curve (AUC) from the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves produced when predicting on the ten different validation
data sets. We then select the regularization parameter from the model that provides the maximum
average validation AUC. After identifying the optimal regularization parameter we search for
multicollinearity by computing the variance inflation factor (VIF) across features used in the
model, and do not find features with a VIF greater than ten [48].
To compare the importance of each feature we implement a greedy deletion algorithm [35].
Our algorithm works in the following way: We start with the N important features used to
predict security incidents identified by the best model (previous paragraph). For N−1 feature
combinations we train regularized models with hyperparameter tuning. From the resulting
models, we identify the model that has the maximum AUC (when predicting on validation data),
and exclude the unused feature in the next iteration of the algorithm. We exclude the unused
feature since it contributes least to the overall AUC compared to the other feature combinations.
We repeat this process until we have a model that uses a single feature (N = 1); the remaining
feature contributes the most to the AUC by itself and in the presence of other features. Finally,
we interpret the results in terms of the changes to the test AUC when features are added to the
final model.
3.6.2 All Features
We run the greedy deletion algorithm (Section 3.6.1) multiple times with different device
groupings: all devices, Windows devices, Mac OS devices, and devices with on-median more
HTTP traffic. We consider devices that produce on-median more HTTP traffic based on our
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Table 3.9. AUC gains from the top four features used to detect devices with security incidents.
For each feature we also provide the ratio of median (continuous) or mean (categorical) values.
Ratios > 1 (green) indicate that compromised devices exhibit more of the feature.
Group Feature Val AUC Test AUC Ratio
All IAB Computer Games +68.3% +69.7% 2.2x
All HTTP Reg Domains +7.0% +5.2% 1.6x
All HTTP in TLD .cn +2.3% +3.7% 3.5x
All Windows Antivirus +1.9% +1.1% 1.7x
Win HTTP FQ Domains +71.9% +71.1% 1.6x
Win IAB Computer Games +4.2% +2.9% 1.7x
Win UA Str Safari +2.2% +2.5% 3x
Win UA Str IE +1.4% +1.3% 1.1x
Mac HTTP in TLD .cn +76% +76% ∞
Mac UA Str IE +5.3% +4.3% 6.2x
Mac HTTP Traffic at 2AM +3.8% -1.3% 0.9x
Mac HTTP in TLD co.kr +1.5% +3.7% 1x
HTTP IAB Shareware +66.3% +60% ∞
HTTP UA Str IE +7.2% +7.9% 1.9x
HTTP UA Str Android +3.4% +1.3% 2.2x
HTTP Uses P2P +1.0% +2.7% 1.3x
observations in Section 3.5.4. Table 3.9 shows the top four features for each grouping, the
feature’s AUC contribution when predicting on validation and test data, and the ratio of the
feature’s median (continuous) or mean (categorical) value for compromised and clean devices.
Since we select the feature combination with the highest validation AUC it is possible that adding
in an extra feature will result in a small negative contribution to the test AUC (e.g., the “HTTP
Traffic at 2AM” feature for Mac OS devices).
Our results indicate that behavioral features, regardless of device grouping, are most
correlated with device compromise. In all cases, the first feature in each grouping relates to how
much a device accesses Web content or the type of content being accessed. Having Windows
antivirus products (a proxy for using Windows, which has a significantly higher compromise
rate), or using P2P applications are the only two software features in the top four of any grouping.
Having the IE User-Agent feature highly ranked highlights the challenge of cursory feature
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Table 3.10. AUC gains for the top eight features used to detect devices with security incidents
one hour before being compromised.
Feature Val AUC Test AUC
IAB Computer Games +71.9% +74.2%
IAB Web Search +4.0% +3.6%
IAB Illegal Content +2.2% +3.6%
IAB JavaScript +1.0% +0.1%
IAB Computer Networking +0.7% +0.1%
IAB Adult Content +0.7% +0.7%
IAB Shareware/Freeware +0.7% +0.4%
IAB Internet Technology +0.5% +1.5%
extraction. Applications can make use of embedded browsers, and examining traffic with an IE
User-Agent string shows many of the detections are from the QQ chat application and Qihoo 360
security product. We also find that compromised devices, in the majority of cases (except for two
features within the Mac OS grouping), exhibit more of each feature compared to clean devices.
3.6.3 One Hour Before Compromise
Lastly, we use our statistical model to examine the relative importance of security
features focusing on the hour leading up to device compromise: Compared to devices that are
not compromised, how are compromised devices behaving differently leading up to becoming
compromised? For each compromised device, we extract their features from the hour before their
first incident. To compare differences in behavior, we construct a synthetic control by taking a
pseudorandom sample of clean devices. Specifically, for each compromised device we randomly
select up to 300 clean devices that are (1) active in the same hour window, and (2) visit at least
50 distinct registered domains.12
Table 3.10 shows the most important features (relative to one another) for identifying
compromised devices an hour before they are compromised. For our devices, the type of Web
sites visited (Section 3.5.3) are the most distinguishing features. On-average, compromised
12On average compromised devices visit 50 distinct registered domains the hour before being compromised.
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devices visit more Web sites in each of the eight categories in Table 3.10 than clean devices. The
most popular domains our devices visit in these categories do correspond well to the category
domains. For some of the very generic labels, “Computer Games” are gaming sites; “Computer
Networking” include ISPs and IP geolocation services; “Internet Technology” include SSL
certificate sites and registrars, etc.
3.7 Conclusion
The practice of cybersecurity implicitly relies on the assumptions that users act “securely”
and that our security advice to them is well-founded. In this paper, we seek to ground both
assumptions empirically – measuring both the prevalence of key security “best practices” as
well as the extent to which these behaviors (and others) relate to eventual security outcomes.
We believe that this kind of analysis is key to advancing security decision making from the
“gut instinct” practice it is today, to one informed and improved by the collection on concrete
evidence.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
Addressing compromised devices is a problem for virtually all large organizations. In
most cases, large organizations must address device compromise using limited observational
vantage points, differences in intervention capabilities, and evolving adversaries with varying
incentives. In this dissertation, we have demonstrated multiple approaches to develop empirically-
grounded systems that address device compromise within different organizations, thereby placing
us on a stronger footing to devise better interventions. We presented solutions that take advantage
of analytic data to determine: what can be measured under the limitations in each organization’s
vantage point, as well as the trade-offs across different types of intervention.
The first system detects and remediates malicious browser extensions impacting Facebook.
From the perspective of an online social network browser extensions themselves are not directly
accessible. Moreover, how or why a extension is installed may be unknown. We described our
methodology whereby users exhibiting suspicious online behaviors are scanned (with permission)
to identify the set of extensions in their browsers, and those extensions are in turn labeled based
on the threat indicators they contain. Employing this methodology at Facebook over six weeks,
we identified more than 1,700 new lexically distinct malicious extensions. Comparing our
findings with both contemporaneous anti-malware detections (as reflected in VirusTotal) and
takedowns from the Chrome Web Store, reveals a considerable detection gap in the existing
abuse ecosystem. We hope that by highlighting this issue and sharing our data we can encourage
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a broader and more collaborative focus on this under-addressed attack vector.
Next, we presented a system to disrupt for-profit underground services offering to artifi-
cially manipulate a user’s social standing on Instagram. Unlike browser extensions the malicious
software used by these services is not required to run directly on each device making the use of a
malware scanner-like approach impractical. We identified techniques used by these services to
evade straightforward detection, and characterized the dynamics of their customer bases using
a honeypot account framework that we developed for Instagram. We found that underground
services are able to attract a large clientele, and generate over $1M in monthly revenue. Lastly,
we have shown through controlled experiments that blocking underground services, while effec-
tive in the short term, quickly drives adaptation and can make it difficult to amortize the cost
of developing accurate abuse classification. For example, underground service quickly reacted
to synchronous blocking applied to their abusive actions. Consequently, from the standpoint of
protecting non-abusive users from artificial content, a more effective long-term strategy can be
built on deferred interventions (e.g., removing synthetic actions after at a future point). Such
approaches greatly increase the “debug time” for services seeking to reverse engineer how they
are being detected and are less likely to drive the customer complaints that incentive services to
pursue such adaptations.
In our final study, we developed a system that passively monitors a university’s residential
network to measure the prevalence of numerous security “ best practices” and behaviors, and
how they correlate to device compromise. Unlike the vantage point of online social networks
which is constrained to social network actions, passive network traffic contains a broader set
of device actions. However, this activity is encoded within network traffic, and fine-grained
detail into the context of each action is commonly obscured by encryption. We described the
implementation of a large-scale passive monitoring system that produces per-device models
describing security practices and behaviors. Analyzing months of longitudinal data we have
shown that a number of recommended security “best practices” are followed by devices, however,
they are not negatively correlated with device compromise–e.g., compromised devices using
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the Chrome or Firefox web browser tend to update faster than clean devices. Most positively
correlated with device compromise is the types of web site devices visit–e.g., web content related
to video games. Lastly, we developed a logistic model to compare the relative importance of the
features we measure and device compromise. Our model shows that behavioral features such are
more useful for distinguishing compromised devices. We believe that this kind of analysis is key
to advancing security decision making from the “gut instinct” practice it is today, to one informed
and improved by the collection on concrete evidence.
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